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Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) and Cancer Research UK have asked us to provide a 
Legal Opinion on the compatibility of the UK draft Standardised Packaging of Tobacco 
Products Regulations
i
 with the revised EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) and, more in 
general, EU Law. Our Opinion contains three main sections:  
 
- the first section sets out the scene and places the UK debate on standardised 
packaging within the Tobacco Control Plan for England and introduces the UK 
proposals; 
 
- the second section focuses on the legislative history and the provisions of the EU 
Tobacco Products Directive on standardised packaging; and 
 
- the third section contains the core of our legal analysis in that it focuses on the 
conditions that the UK should comply with if it wishes to introduce standardised 
packaging in its territory in a manner compatible both with the TPD and the EU 
Treaties. 
 
 
I. Setting the scene: the UK proposal to introduce standardised packaging of 
tobacco products 
 
 
1. The epidemiology of smoking  
 
The tobacco epidemic is one of the biggest public health threats the world has ever faced, 
killing nearly six million people a year. More than five million of those deaths are the result 
of direct tobacco use, while more than 600,000 are the result of non-smokers being exposed 
to second-hand smoke. Approximately one person dies every six seconds due to tobacco, 
accounting for one in 10 adult deaths. Up to half of current users will eventually die of a 
tobacco-related disease, including cancer, lung diseases, and cardiovascular diseases. 
Tobacco users who die prematurely deprive their families of income, raise the cost of health 
care and hinder economic development.
(1)
 
 
                                                             
i This memo considers in particular the draft regulations at Appendix B in the consultation on standardised packaging of 
tobacco products: draft regulations, which set out the proposed requirements for standardised packaging, should it be 
introduced. 
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Even though nearly 80% of the more than one billion smokers worldwide live in low- and 
middle-income countries, where the burden of tobacco-related illness and death is heaviest, 
tobacco use remains one of the main sources of death and non-communicable diseases in 
Europe: the European Union (EU) estimates that „smoking causes 700,000 deaths a year, 
more than the combined number caused by car and work accidents, AIDS, suicides, 
homicides and drugs‟. (2)  Despite considerable progress made in recent years, the number of 
smokers in the EU is still high – 28% of the overall population and 29% of young Europeans 
aged 15-24 smoke. 94% of smokers take up smoking before they are 25 years of age, and 
around 50% die prematurely (some 14 years earlier) and have more life years in poor 
health.
(2)
 
 
There are still more than 8 million smokers in England, where „smoking causes more 
preventable deaths than anything else – nearly 80,000 in England during 2011. There‟s also 
an impact on smokers‟ families: each year, UK hospitals see around 9,500 admissions of 
children with illnesses caused by secondhand smoke‟. (3) 
 
 
2. The importance of prevention 
 
The addictive nature of tobacco use and the specific problems which it raises reinforce the 
importance of prevention, and in particular the need to create enabling environments on the 
basis of comprehensive, co-ordinated, multi-sectoral and multi-level strategies, as required by 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
(4)
 and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable 
Diseases 2013-2020.
(5)
 
 
The FCTC is the first global public health Treaty adopted under the auspices of WHO. The 
Convention entered into force on 27 February 2005. As of September 2014, 179 states are 
parties to the FCTC. Both the EU and its 28 Member States have signed and ratified the 
Treaty and are therefore legally bound by its provisions. The FCTC is based on evidence and 
addresses both the demand and the supply sides of tobacco consumption.
ii
 
 
 
3. The 2011 Tobacco Control Plan for England 
 
The UK Government has undertaken to try and reduce smoking rates by the end of 2015 to: 
 
- 18.5% or less for adults (compared to 21.2% for April 2009 to March 2010) - 
meaning around 210,000 fewer smokers per year; 
- 12% or less for 15 year olds (compared to 15% in 2009); and 
                                                             
ii See Articles 6 to 14 and Articles 15 to 17 respectively of the WHO FCTC,  supplemented by the Protocol to Eliminate 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, signed in November 2012, and a series of Guidelines (seven to date).  
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- 11% or less for pregnant women, measured at the time of giving birth (compared to 
14% over 2009 to 2010).
(3)
 
 
To this effect, it published „Healthy Lives, Healthy People: A Tobacco Control plan for 
England‟ in March 2011, which includes commitments to: 
 
- implement legislation to end tobacco displays in shops 
- look at whether the plain packaging of tobacco products could be an effective way to 
reduce the number of young people who take up smoking and to support adult 
smokers who want to quit, and consult on options by the end of the year 
- continue to defend tobacco legislation against legal challenges by the tobacco 
industry, including legislation to stop tobacco sales from vending machines from 
October 2011 
- continue to follow a policy of using taxation to maintain the high price of tobacco 
products at levels that impact on smoking prevalence 
- promote effective local enforcement of tobacco legislation, particularly on the age of 
sale of tobacco 
- encourage more smokers to quit by using the most effective forms of support, through 
local stop smoking services 
- publish a three-year marketing strategy for tobacco control.(6) 
 
This multi-sectoral strategy is intended to tackle the different determinants of smoking. As 
such, it is very much in line with the FCTC. It also has a particular focus on young people: 
 
„While nicotine keeps tobacco users physically dependent, there are a wide range of 
social and behavioural factors that encourage young people to take up smoking and 
that make it harder for tobacco users to quit. The Government‟s approach to 
improving public health includes tackling the wider social determinants of health and 
it aims to build people‟s self-esteem, confidence and resilience, right from infancy. To 
promote health and wellbeing, we will work to encourage communities across 
England to reshape social norms, so that tobacco becomes less desirable, less 
acceptable and less accessible. We want all communities to see a tobacco-free world 
as the norm and we aim to stop the perpetuation of smoking from one generation to 
the next. To reduce smoking uptake by young people, we all need to influence the 
adult world in which they grow up. We must also remove the considerable social 
barriers that smokers face when they are trying to quit.‟ (7) 
 
 
4. Standardised packaging in the UK Tobacco Control Plan 
 
The rest of this report focuses on one of the components of the UK‘s tobacco control strategy: 
the introduction of standardised packaging of tobacco products. 
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Timeline 
 
In its 2011 Tobacco Control Plan, the Department of Health undertook to consult on „options 
to reduce the promotional impact of tobacco packaging, including plain packaging, before 
the end of 2011‟.(8) In particular, it stated that it would look at whether the plain packaging of 
tobacco products could be effective in reducing the number of young people who take up 
smoking and in supporting adult smokers who want to quit: „the Government wants to make it 
easier for people to make healthy choices but wants to understand whether there is evidence 
to demonstrate that plain packaging would have an additional public health benefit. We will 
explore the competition, trade and legal implications, and the likely impact on the illicit 
tobacco market of options around tobacco packaging.‟(9) 
 
The Government ran a consultation on standardising the packaging of tobacco products 
between April and August 2012, for views on whether standardised packaging could reduce 
the appeal of tobacco, make health warnings more effective, make packaging less misleading 
about health effects and change how children and young people think about smoking.
(10)
 
 
At the time, the Government explicitly stated that it was „keeping an open mind on this issue‟, 
and had not „made any proposals yet‟.(10) A report summarising the responses to the 
consultation was published in July 2013,
(11)
 accompanied by an Impact Assessment Report
(12)
 
and an Equality Impact Assessment Report.
(13)
 The Government also commissioned an 
independent academic review of the evidence supporting plain packaging.
(14)
 
 
In total, the Government received 2,444 detailed responses (alongside 665,989 campaign 
responses). As could have been expected, strongly differing views were expressed in this 
consultation: 53% of the respondents who provided detailed feedback argued in favour of 
introducing standardised packaging – including some 190 health organisations, as opposed to 
43% against. „Having carefully considered these differing views‟, the Secretary of State for 
Health, Jeremy Hunt, decided to „wait until the emerging impact of the decision can be 
measured before we make a final decision on this policy in England. […] Standardised 
packaging therefore remains a policy under consideration.‟(15) 
 
On 28 November 2013, the Public Health Minister, Jane Ellison, made a statement to the 
House of Commons in which she declared that it was time to „examine the emerging evidence 
base‟ and that standardised tobacco packaging would be brought in after the review of 
existing evidence if „we are satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to proceed‟, including 
public health benefit.
(16)
 The review was entrusted to paediatrician Sir Cyril Chantler who 
was asked to look at whether there was likely to be an effect on public health, particularly for 
children, if standardised tobacco packaging were to be introduced.
(17)
 It is important to note 
that the focus of the Chantler Review is placed exclusively on the evidence and not on the 
legal issues surrounding the introduction of standardised packaging.
(18)
 
 
Sir Cyril Chantler sought to conduct his review on the principles of transparency and 
independence, and relied on an independent secretariat. He delivered his report on 3 April 
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2014.
(19)
 Although Sir Cyril Chantler did not reopen the public consultation on standardised 
packaging that the UK government previously organised, he decided to publish a call for the 
collection of all evidence available. Thus, Public Health England published its submission to 
the Chantler Review on 13 January 2014, expressing its strong support for the introduction of 
standardised packaging in the UK: „standardised packaging will be fundamentally important 
in helping to reduce the incidence and prevalence of smoking, and there is significant 
evidence to support its introduction‟.(20) Sir Cyril Chantler also drew evidence from a range 
of sources he considered necessary and appropriate, including a visit to Australia in March 
2014 to study the implementation of plain packaging there.  
 
By building on the pre-existing Stirling review
(19)
 – „the most extensive and authoritative 
piece of work on the issue of standardised packaging yet undertaken‟, his review provides an 
independent view which will help the Government make a decision on whether to go ahead 
with standardised tobacco packaging.
(21)
 
 
While the report does not provide a detailed definition of „standardised packaging‟iii, its 
analysis largely refers to and builds upon the scheme in Australia, which became the first 
country to legislate for standardised packaging in 2011.
iv
 
 
The Government also tabled an amendment to the Children and Families Bill, which was then 
being considered in the House of Lords. The amendment provides powers to bring forward 
regulations to introduce standardised packaging if the Government decides to do so following 
Sir Cyril‘s review and consideration of the wider issues raised by this policy.(22) In particular, 
the amendment provides that regulations could be adopted if they may contribute to any of 
the following: 
 
a. discouraging people from starting to use tobacco products; 
b.  encouraging people to give up using tobacco products; 
                                                             
iii The 2012 consultation proposed the following approach to standardised packaging: (i) All internal and external packaging 
to be in a prescribed colour/s (ii) All text on the pack, including brand names, to be in a standard colour and typeface (iii) No 
branding, advertising or promotion to be permitted on the outside or inside of packs, attached to the package or on individual 
tobacco products themselves. For this purpose ‗branding‘ includes logos, colours or other features associated with a tobacco 
brand (iv) Any foils within a pack to be of a standard format and colour with no text permitted (v) Packs to be of a standard 
shape and opening and possibly manufactured with particular materials (vi) Only the following information or markings are 
to be permitted on packs: a brand name ; a product name ; the quantity of product in the packaging : the name and contact 
details of the manufacturer ; one barcode to facilitate sale and stock control ; health warnings, as currently required ; tar, 
nicotine and carbon monoxide yield information, as currently required ; product identification marking, as currently 
required ; fiscal mark requirements, as currently required ; markings not visible to the naked eye to assist with the 
identification of genuine, duty-paid products, or other features to prevent fraud (vii) Any wrapper around the pack to be 
transparent and colourless, without any other markings visible to the naked eye. 
iv On 1st December 2012, Australia became the first country to require plain packaging of all tobacco products. Generic drab 
brown colour and identical plain text fonts noting only the brand and product type have replaced the use of all brand logos 
and colours Additionally, the size of required graphic pictorial health warning labels have been increased: they must now 
cover 75% of the front and 90% of the back of the package with additional text warnings on the package sides; they must 
also include the national quit line number. Misleading and deceptive product descriptors such as ‗light‘ and ‗mild‘ are also 
prohibited: see the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth), section 19 (Australia) and the Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Regulations 2011 (Cth), regulation 2.2.1 (Australia). On the Australian experience with plain packaging, see, e.g. J. 
Liberman. Plainly Constitutional: The Upholding of Plain Tobacco Packaging by the High Court of Australia. Journal of 
Law and Medicine 39 (2013) 361, and M. Rimmer. The High Court of Australia and the Marlboro Man: The Battle over the 
Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products. In T. Voon, A. Mitchell, and J. Liberman, Regulating Tobacco, Alcohol and 
Unhealthy Foods: The Legal Issues (2014). Chapter 17. Routledge 
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c.  helping people who have given up, or are trying to give up, using tobacco products 
not to start using them again; 
d.  reducing the appeal or attractiveness of tobacco products; 
e.  reducing the potential for elements of the packaging of tobacco products other than 
health warnings to detract from the effectiveness of those warnings; 
f.  reducing opportunities for the packaging of tobacco products to mislead consumers 
about the effects of using them; 
g.  reducing opportunities for the packaging of tobacco products to create false 
perceptions about the nature of such products; 
h.  having an effect on attitudes, beliefs, intentions and behaviours relating to the 
reduction in use of tobacco products.
(22)
 
  
Following the adoption of this amendment on 13 March 2014, provisions in section 94 of the 
Children and Families Act 2014 enable the Secretary of State to regulate the retail packaging 
of tobacco products, if he or she considers that the regulations as a whole may contribute to 
reducing the risk of harm to, or promoting the health or welfare of, children. In making the 
decision he or she may also take into account whether the regulations would reduce the risk 
of harm to adults. Ministers may also specify requirements for the products themselves, for 
example: the appearance of individual cigarettes. 
 
The Chantler Review was published on 3rd April 2014. Sir Cyril concluded that:  “…there is 
enough evidence to say that standardised packaging is very likely to contribute to a modest 
but important reduction in smoking… Given the dangers of smoking, the suffering that it 
causes, the highly addictive nature of nicotine, the fact that most smokers become addicted 
when they are children or young adults and the overall cost to society, the importance of such 
a reduction should not be underestimated.‖(23) The Public Health Minister. Jane Ellison MP, 
said in a written statement that the report found standardised packaging "very likely to have a 
positive impact" on public health. She went on to say: ―In the light of the report and the 
responses to the previous consultation in 2012, I am minded to proceed with introducing 
regulations to provide for standardised packaging‖ and that she wished to ―proceed as swiftly 
as possible‖. She also reported that the Government‘s Chief Medical Officer, Professor Dame 
Sally Davies, had written to her supporting the conclusion of the Chantler review and 
supporting the introduction of standardised packaging. 
(24)
 
 
Before reaching a decision on whether to introduce standardised packaging of tobacco 
products, the UK Government published on 26 June 2014 a Consultation on the introduction 
of regulations for standardised packaging of tobacco products. The purpose of this 
consultation was to seek the views of interested people, businesses and organisations, with a 
focus on gaining any additional information relevant to standardised packaging that had 
arisen since the 2012 consultation.
(25)
 
The consultation included draft regulations illustrating how requirements for standardised 
packaging would work in practice. The draft regulations set out inter alia proposed 
requirements for the packaging of cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco, and requirements for 
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the appearance of individual cigarettes should standardised packaging be introduced.
v
 
Alongside the consultation, an updated consultation-stage Impact Assessment and Equalities 
Analysis were also published that have been - insofar as is relevant - considered in our Legal 
Opinion. 
 
The Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations  
 
The UK draft regulations laid down a set of requirements for the packaging of cigarettes and 
hand-rolling tobacco, as well requirements for the appearance of individual cigarettes should 
standardised packaging be introduced. They find their legal basis in sections 94 and 135(2) 
and (3) of the Children and Families Act 2014 and section 2(2) of the European Communities 
Act 1972.  
The requirements introduced by the draft regulations apply measures relating to the 
presentation and appearance of products and their packaging set out in Articles 13 and 14 of 
the EU Tobacco Products Directive. These include, for example, those relating to the shape 
and material used in cigarette and handrolled tobacco packs, the type of lid used for cigarette 
packs, the minimum quantity (cigarettes) or weight (handrolled tobacco); and prohibition of 
elements or features which are misleading.  
 
The draft regulations also require the use of specified standard colours for all external and 
internal packaging and only permit specified text in a standard typeface. In so doing, these 
provisions introduce a form of standardised packaging analogous to that enacted in Australia, 
well beyond what the EU TPD prescribes. The consultation closed on 7 August 2014 and the 
UK government notified the draft regulations to the Commission on 29 August 2014. The 
main content of the regulations as notified to the EU are as follows 
(26)
:  
 
Pack Colour (regulations 3 and 7) 
• The outside surfaces of packs (external packaging) would be drab brown with a matt 
finish. 
• The inside surfaces of packs (internal packaging) would be white or drab brown with a 
matt finish. 
 
Permitted text and features (Schedules 1, 3) 
•     Text on packaging would be in a grey Helvetica typeface with a specified maximum 
size. 
 
• Brand and variant names may appear once on each of the front, top and bottom 
surfaces of cigarette packs, once on each of the front and back surfaces and on the surface 
hidden beneath the flap of hand-rolling tobacco pouches.  
•           A bar code may appear once on a pack or pouch to facilitate sale and stock control. 
                                                             
v While the Government has yet to make any final decisions on whether to introduce standardised packaging, the draft 
regulations are included at appendix B of the Consultation document 
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• A producer‟s contact details may appear once on a pack or pouch.  
• The pack or pouch may include a measurement mark and a trade description 
(for example: “20 cigarettes” or “30g hand-rolling tobacco”). 
 
• If a pack of hand-rolling tobacco includes filters or cigarette papers inside the pack, 
then the pack may have text giving this information (for example: “includes cigarette papers 
and filters” or “includes cigarette papers”). 
 
Cigarette packets (Regulation 4) 
• Cigarette packets must be cuboid and made of either a carton or soft material. If 
packets can be re-closed or re-sealed, then they must either have a flip-tip lid or be a 
shoulder box with a hinged lid. 
• A pack of cigarettes must contain a minimum of 20 cigarettes.  
 
Packets of Hand-rolling tobacco (Regulation 8) 
• Hand-rolling tobacco packets must be cuboid, cylindrical or in the form of a pouch. 
• A pack of hand-rolling tobacco must contain at least 30 grams of tobacco. 
 
Other provisions (Schedules 3 and 4 and Regulations 11 and 12) 
• Pack surfaces must be smooth, with no embossing or irregularities of texture. 
• Wrappers must be completely clear and transparent. 
• Inserts or other additional material not integral to the packaging would be prohibited.  
 
Individual cigarettes (Regulation 5) 
• Cigarettes would be white with a cork effect or white tip and may have text indicating 
the brand name (in a specified typeface, size and location). 
 
The draft regulations would also implement Articles 13 and 14 of the Tobacco Products 
Directive (Directive 2014/40/EU) (see Regulations 4, 8 and 10 of the draft regulations). 
 
The rationale for and the evidence supporting the imposition of standardised packaging 
 
Standardised packaging aims to reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco products, 
increase the noticeability and effectiveness of mandated health warnings, reduce the ability of 
retail packaging to mislead consumers about the harms of smoking, and help change 
smoking-related attitudes, beliefs, intentions and behaviour. The more standardised the 
packaging of tobacco products, the less visually appealing the products are. 
 
Plain packaging as a form of standardised packaging 
 
As a preliminary remark, it is important to note that packaging standardisation is a matter of 
degree, and that standardised packaging does not necessarily equate with „plain 
packaging‟.(27) This understanding is confirmed by the EU Tobacco Products Directive that, 
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although it falls short of introducing „full standardisation‟ (i.e. plain packaging), it expressly 
recognises that the individual Member States (emphasis added to text here and subsequently 
in underline and bold) „should, under certain conditions, retain the power to impose further 
requirements in certain respects in order to protect public health. This is the case in relation 
to the presentation and the packaging, including colours, of tobacco products other than 
health warnings, for which this Directive provides a first set of basic common rules‟. 
Accordingly, Member States could, for example, introduce provisions providing for further 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products, provided that those provisions are 
compatible with the TFEU, with World Trade Organization WTO obligations and do not 
affect the full application of this Directive‟.(28) 
 
As defined in law by Australia „plain packaging‟ (also referred to as „generic‟ packaging) 
represents the most extreme form of package standardisation, as tobacco products are put in 
drab, purposefully unattractive packaging, devoid of branding (other than name) or 
promotional information. It can only bear the brand names displayed in a mandated size, font 
and place.
(29)
 In Australia, the enacted plain packaging scheme includes some restrictions on 
size and shape and the pack is in brown/olive packaging and mat cardboard. There are no 
special foils, tapes, and laminating or special print effects. Packages are dominated by large 
and prominent (graphic and textual) health warnings. 
 
There is a range of other less intrusive forms of standardisation than plain packaging as 
defined by Australia. Thus, any attempt at limiting the freedom to design a package through 
the imposition of some presentation standards, such as a given size, shape, colour and 
presentation characteristics, automatically translates into a form of pack standardisation: as a 
result of these requirements, the appearance of the products, or at least part of it, may end up 
being harmonised across a given segment of products. For example, the duty to affix 
mandatory graphic and/or pictorial health warnings on a package inevitably produces the 
effect of standardising the presentation of any given product. This is due to the fact that, as a 
result of these requirements, the size, colour, font and often also the positioning of those 
warnings are determined by law. As they reduce the ability of manufacturers to design the 
presentation of their products, all forms of packaging standardisation are often referred to, 
especially by the tobacco industry, as „space appropriation measures‟. 
 
A range of measures have already been imposed at EU level which standardise certain 
aspects of tobacco packaging, not least mandatory textual and pictorial warnings on all 
tobacco packaging. As illustrated above, the standardisation requirements envisaged in the 
UK go much further than those measures. 
 
A look at the images below suffices to identify the major differences between the UK 
proposed pack of cigarettes and the one required by the EU.
vi
 
 
                                                             
vi An illustration of how a cigarette pack may look if the draft regulations were introduced is included at appendix C of the 
Consultation on Standardised packaging of tobacco products: draft regulations 
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Pack as enacted by the EU TPD 
 
 
Pack as envisaged by the UK draft regulations 
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Standardised packaging as a further restriction on the advertising of tobacco products 
 
Given the prominent role played by the appearance, imagery and general packaging of 
tobacco products, policy makers should consider the extent to which they should reduce the 
ability of tobacco manufacturers to market their products as they wish. In particular, as 
regulators have become aware of the power of marketing to induce consumer choices, they 
are reflecting on how they should offset those marketing techniques. Whilst the regulation of 
product packaging may play an important role in providing important information to 
consumers, it may also attempt to dissuade consumption. 
 
The rationale underpinning all forms of package standardisation is to reduce the 
attractiveness of the relevant products: firstly, by conveying negative information about the 
products available to consumers and, secondly, by reducing the ability of manufacturers to 
design and present them as they wish. These measures rely on the assumption that, given the 
proven association between marketing efforts and growing consumption, the introduction of 
standardised forms of packaging may lower the prevalence of the consumption of the relevant 
product at either the population or the individual level or both.
(30)
 
 
Packaging is an important element of advertising and promotion. Tobacco pack or product 
features are used in various ways to attract consumers, to promote products and to cultivate 
and promote brand identity, for example by using logos, colours, fonts, pictures, shapes and 
materials on or in packs or on individual cigarettes or other tobacco products.
(31)
 As a result 
of the wide-ranging restrictions imposed on the advertising, the sponsorship and other forms 
of promotion for tobacco products, packaging design has become one of the last remaining 
opportunities for tobacco manufacturers to promote their products and brands to 
consumers.
(32)
 
 
The FCTC, read in conjunction with the Guidelines for implementation of Article 11 on 
packaging and labelling and Article 13 on advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
(33)
 
presents plain packaging as having the potential to eliminate the effect of advertising and 
promotion on packaging. Thus, it calls on its Parties to consider „adopting measures to 
restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colours, brand images or promotional information on 
packaging other than brand names and product names displayed in a standard colour and 
font style (plain packaging). This may increase the noticeability and effectiveness of health 
warnings and messages, prevent the package from detracting attention from them, and 
address industry package design techniques that may suggest that some products are less 
harmful than others‟.vii 
                                                             
vii  See Guidelines for implementation of Article 11 of the WHO FCTC, at paragraph 46. See also Guidelines for 
implementation of Article 13 of the WHO FCTC, at paragraph 16 (advertising, promotion and sponsorship): The effect of 
advertising or promotion on packaging can be eliminated by requiring plain packaging: black and white or two other 
contrasting colours, as prescribed by national authorities; nothing other than a brand name, a product name and/or 
manufacturer‘s name, contact details and the quantity of product in the packaging, without any logos or other features apart 
from health warnings, tax stamps and other government-mandated information or markings; prescribed font style and size; 
and standardized shape, size and materials. There should be no advertising or promotion inside or attached to the package or 
on individual cigarettes or other tobacco products‘. Moreover, if plain packaging is not yet mandated, paragraph 17 invites 
Parties to consider imposing packaging restrictions which ‗cover as many as possible of the design features that make 
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These calls were reiterated in WHO‘s latest report on the global tobacco epidemic 2013, 
which incidentally focuses on enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship.
(34)
 In this report, WHO explicitly stated that „package design serves an 
increasingly critical role in promoting tobacco use as other tobacco advertising, promotion 
and sponsorship activities are restricted or prohibited‟.(35) Consequently, and in light of the 
growing body of evidence establishing that the standardisation of packaging can be an 
effective tobacco control measure, WHO has taken a clear stance in favour of plain 
packaging: „[p]arties should consider adopting plain (or generic) packaging requirements to 
eliminate the advertising and promotional effects of packaging. Product packaging, 
individual cigarettes or other tobacco products should carry no advertising or promotion, 
including design features that make products more attractive to consumers.‟ (36) 
 
The existing evidence on plain packaging 
 
The 2013 WHO Tobacco Report highlights certain research findings on plain packaging. In 
particular, it states that requiring plain packaging – without colour, pictures or distinctive 
typefaces, other than required health warnings – minimises the ability to promote brands.(37) 
Furthermore, plain packaging enhances the impact of health warnings and other packaging 
and labelling measures.
(38)
 Finally, many youth consider that plain packaging is unattractive 
and that it reinforces negative attitudes toward smoking.
(39)
 However, this report does not 
purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of the evidence base supporting plain packaging.  
 
To date, two systematic reviews have attempted to assess the evidence on the impact of plain 
packaging of tobacco products. Firstly, the Cancer Council of Victoria published a report in 
April 2011 (updated in August 2011).
(40)
 Secondly, the systematic review, commissioned by 
the UK Department of Health as part of its consultation on plain packaging (see above), was 
published in July 2012, highlighting the findings from 37 studies on the three potential 
benefits of plain packaging identified by WHO: appeal, perceptions of harm, and salience and 
effectiveness of health warnings; as well as what the available literature had found about 
smoking-related attitudes, beliefs, intentions and behaviour in respect to plain packaging, and 
facilitators and barriers to plain packaging.
(14)
 It was subsequently updated (though this was 
not commissioned by the Department of Health); the update, published in September 2013, 
identified 17 studies published between August 2011 (the cut-off date for study inclusion in 
the original systematic review) and mid-September 2013, reinforcing the findings of the 
earlier review.
(41)
  
 
Both reviews clearly support the introduction of plain packaging as an effective tobacco 
control measure. Overall, the evidence concurs in suggesting that plain packaging would 
reduce the appeal of cigarettes and smoking; enhance the salience of health warnings on 
packs; address the use of packaging elements that mislead smokers about product harm; and 
contribute to a change in smoking-related attitudes, beliefs, intentions and behaviour. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
tobacco products more attractive to consumers such as animal or other figures, ―fun‖ phrases, coloured cigarette papers, 
attractive smells, novelty or seasonal packs‘. 
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If one looks more specifically at the review of evidence commissioned by the UK 
Department of Public Health, the following elements emerge: 
 
- As far as the appeal of tobacco products is concerned, studies comparing responses to 
plain and branded packs have consistently found that plain packs reduce the appeal of 
the pack, of the cigarettes contained within it, and of smoking in general. 
 
- As far as the salience of health warnings on packs is concerned, plain packs are 
perceived as detracting less than other packs from the health warning. Furthermore, 
the dullness of the packs enhances the seriousness and believability of warnings. 
 
- As far as perceptions of product harm are concerned, plain packs are perceived as 
more effective than branded packs. The findings are mixed, as perceptions vary 
according to the colour of the plain pack:  in general, darker coloured plain packs are 
seen as more harmful, and lighter coloured plain packs less harmful, than branded 
cigarettes. Moreover, descriptors such as „gold‟ or „smooth‟ also affect response: in 
general, plain packs without descriptors are perceived as more harmful than packs 
with descriptors, thus suggesting that descriptor terms have the potential to mislead 
consumers about harm when used both on plain packs or on branded packs.  
 
- As far as smoking-related attitudes, beliefs, intentions and behaviour are concerned, 
the systematic review found that the overall pattern of results is mixed but tends to be 
supportive of plain packaging as having a deterrent effect on smoking. In particular, 
studies have found that when young adults put their own cigarettes in plain packs they 
are more likely to think about quitting, want to quit and engage in cessation-related 
behaviours. 
 
The evidence review conducted by Sir Cyril Chantler largely confirms the benefits which 
plain packaging would have on public health. In particular, his report highlighted the 
importance of the Stirling evidence as being the consistency of its results on appeal, salience 
and perceptions of harms, and most notably that standardised packaging is less appealing than 
branded packaging. This evidence is direct and not reliant on stated intentions. Thus, by 
reducing its appeal, standardised packaging would affect smoking behaviour.
(42)
 The Review 
concludes in no uncertain terms: „Although I have not seen evidence that allows me to 
quantify the size of the likely impact of standardised packaging, I am satisfied that the body 
of evidence shows that standardised packaging, in conjunction with the current tobacco 
control regime, is very likely to lead to a modest but important reduction over time on the 
uptake and prevalence of smoking and thus have a positive impact on public health.‘(43) 
 
 
This Legal Opinion does not purport to provide an exhaustive review of existing 
evidence on plain packaging. This would fall beyond our expertise. However, we discuss 
relevant evidence wherever necessary in our legal analysis of the compatibility of the 
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UK draft Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations with the recently 
adopted revised EU Tobacco Products Directive and EU law more generally. 
 
The rest of this report focuses on the extent to which EU law constrains the 
development of a scheme – such as the one proposed by the UK draft Standardised 
Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations – that would introduce the standardised 
packaging of tobacco products on its territory. After presenting the relevant provisions 
of the Tobacco Products Directive (II), it evaluates the extent to which they affect the 
freedom of Member States, and the UK more specifically, to impose standardised 
packaging measures – understood as ‘plain packaging’ – of tobacco products on their 
territories. 
 
 
  
15 
 
II. Plain packaging in the EU Tobacco Products Directive 
 
Before analysing in detail the legal implications stemming from the introduction of 
standardised packaging as a tobacco control tool in the individual Member States of the 
Union,
(32)
 it is necessary to briefly contextualise this policy option within the broader 
framework of EU tobacco control.  
 
1. Introduction to EU tobacco control 
 
EU tobacco control efforts have historically been marked by a strong regulatory involvement 
of the EU, coupled with recommendations to Member States and EU-wide anti-smoking 
campaigns.
(44)
 This is because, as of today, virtually all legislation on labelling, advertising 
and product regulation enacted by the EU has been based on the internal market legal basis 
provided by Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
This provision empowers the EU to replace, by a qualified majority vote, divergent national 
legislations with a common rule applicable across the whole territory.
(45)
 Yet, since the 
objective pursued by tobacco control policies, such as labelling, advertising and product 
regulation restrictions, is to reduce tobacco consumption rather than to promote the free 
movement of tobacco, reliance on this legal basis may appear, at least prima facie, somehow 
inconsistent. The reason behind such a choice lies in the limited competences enjoyed by the 
EU in the area of public health. Although the protection of public health is one of the basic 
requirements that the EU has to take into account in the enactment of any of its policies or 
activities,
(46)
 including its internal market policy,
(47)
 Member States remain generally 
competent to adopt public health measures.
(48)
 However, the EU has thus far not hesitated to 
rely on the internal market legal basis to provide a strict legal regime for both the advertising 
and production of tobacco products. 
 
The EU tobacco control policy rests on two main regulatory instruments: the EU Tobacco 
Products Directive (TPD) and the Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD).
viii
 Since their 
adoption, the EU has become a party to the FCTC, thus becoming for the first time an actor 
alongside its 28 Member States on the public health scene at global level. 
 
 
2. The genesis of the 2014 TPD and plain packaging  
 
In order to go beyond the FCTC‘s minimal requirements,(49) and in an effort to closely 
implement its Guidelines, the EU adopted on 14 March 2014 a revised TPD aimed at 
strengthening and modernising its existing tobacco control policy.
ix
 The original TPD, which 
                                                             
viii Directive 2003/33, OJ 2003 L152/16: (Articles 3 and 4 more specifically). Only publications intended for professionals in 
the tobacco trade and publications from non-EU countries which are not principally intended for the EU market are 
exempted from the cross-border advertising and sponsorship ban the Tobacco Advertising Directive imposes.  
ix The new Directive entered into force in May 2014. A transposition period of two years for Member States to bring national 
legislation into line with the revised Directive means that most of the new rules will apply in the first half of 2016. However, 
the Directive also foresees a transitional period for all product categories to give manufacturers and retailers time to sell off 
their existing stock insofar as it complies with the old Directive or other relevant legislation. 
16 
 
was adopted in 2001, famously introduced far-reaching tobacco control measures, such as 
voluntary graphic health warnings and a ban on misleading descriptors (such as „mild,‟ „light‟ 
or „low tar‟). Moreover, it reinforced several pre-existing pack space appropriation measures 
by, for example, increasing the size of text health warnings; and establishing maximum tar, 
nicotine, and carbon monoxide levels (commonly referred to as TNCO) for cigarettes.  
 
Yet, „new international, scientific and market developments‟ – including the entry into force 
of the FCTC – led the EU to verify whether the original TPD „still fully guarantees‟ its 
original objectives: to facilitate the functioning of the internal market in the tobacco products 
sector while ensuring a high level of health protection. This is the dual rationale behind the 
revised TPD as they originally emerged from the Public Consultation Document, published 
by the European Commission in 2010,
x
 and were confirmed by the adopted revised TPD.
(50)
 
 
Besides broadening the scope of the Directive, such as to include electronic cigarettes, herbal 
cigarettes, water pipes, and paraphernalia, the envisaged revisions contemplated the 
introduction of equally ground-breaking policy tools, such as plain packaging, aimed at 
further strengthening existing rules. However, the first mention of plain packaging in an EU 
document occurred in the Second Report on the Application of the TPD, where the 
Commission wrote: „in order to decrease the smoking initiation and to protect EU consumers 
on an equal basis in all Member States the introduction of generic (black and white) 
standardised packaging for all tobacco products could be explored as a possibility to reduce 
their attractiveness‟.xi The term „plain packaging‟ was first employed in the 2009 Council 
Recommendation on smoke-free environment,
(50)
 inviting the Commission to „analyse the 
legal issues and the evidence base for the impact of plain packaging, including on the 
functioning of the internal market‟.(51) This term has been used since then as defining the 
most radical form of standardisation of the package.
xii
  
 
 
3. Plain packaging in the public consultation document on the revision of the TPD 
 
When the EU Commission announced its intention to revise the TPD, it published a 
document illustrating the need for this revision and listing possible areas of intervention: (1) 
scope; (2) smokeless tobacco products; (3) consumer information; (4) reporting and 
registration of ingredients; (5) regulating ingredients; and (6) access to tobacco products. For 
                                                             
x  European Commission. Public Consultation Document on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 
2001/37/EC. The need for a revision has also been highlighted by the European Parliament, the Member States and other 
stakeholders, as well as by the Commission itself in relation to its commitment to promote work on tobacco ingredients at 
the time of the adoption of the REACH Regulation. European Commission. Second Report on the Application of the 
Tobacco Products Directive. COM(2007) 754 final; 2007; p.3 
xi Ibid., p.11 
xii Sir Cyril Chantler suggests in his report that although the terms ‗standardised packaging‘ and ‗plain packaging‘ are often 
used interchangeably, the ‗latter may involve fewer restrictions on, for example, size and shape of packs than fully 
standardised packaging‘. While this might be true in the future, the Australian example, by representing today the most 
standardised form of packaging in the world, is often equated with plain packaging. The EU documents accompanying the 
preparation of the TPD confirm this understanding. See, e.g. European Commission (2014): MEMO/14/134. Questions & 
Answers: New rules for tobacco products. (‗The new Directive specifically allows Member States to introduce further 
measures relating to standardisation of packaging or plain packaging‘). 
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each of those areas, the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) of the 
European Commission envisaged a number of measures to strengthen the current regulation 
by clustering them into three policy options depending on the degree of change envisioned 
(from „no change‟ to „revision of the directive with the objective of strengthening product 
regulation‟). In addressing areas 3 and 6, the Commission contemplated for the first time the 
introduction of plain packaging as a policy option that the EU legislator may consider as part 
of its revision of the TPD. The consultation document was preceded by a study preparing the 
ground for a DG SANCO impact assessment.
(52)
 This document examined the various options 
for amendment identified by the Commission and was followed by a public consultation 
process.
xiii
  
 
 
4. The notion of plain packaging as envisioned in the public consultation document 
 
In contemplating for the first time the introduction of plain packaging as a policy option that 
the EU legislator might consider as part of its revision of the TPD, the Commission provided 
a first definition: 
 
„[P]lain or generic packaging would standardise the appearance of tobacco 
packaging. Manufacturers would only be allowed to print brand and product names, 
the quantity of the product, health warnings and other mandatory information such as 
security marking. The package itself would be plain coloured (such as white, grey or 
plain cardboard). The size and shape of the package could also be regulated.
xiv
 
 
This definition is in line with the definition provided by the Guidelines for the 
implementation of Article 11 and Article 13 of the FCTC,
(33)
 which refer to the potential of 
plain packaging to eliminate the effect of advertising and promotion on packaging.
(53)
 The 
stated objective of generic packaging is to undermine the allure of smoking, especially for 
adolescents, in the hope that smoking up-take rates may be reduced.
(54)
 In particular, plain 
packaging is considered in the Public Consultation Document as one of the policy options 
available to the EU legislator to attain three different objectives: 
 
1. Firstly, this policy tool might help overcome the existing disparities in labelling, 
which stem from the current voluntary pictorial warnings regime, since this 
regime has led some — but not all — Member States to make pictorial warnings 
                                                             
xiii European Commission. Public Consultation Document on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 
2001/37/EC, at p. 22. While the Commission presents this consultation as ‗an example of the great interest of the general 
public and stakeholders in the EU policymaking process‘, the high number of submissions received (around 85,000) reveals 
misuses of the consultation mechanism. Indeed, not only were 2/3 of the contributions received from two Member States 
(Italy and Poland), but out of the 96% responses submitted by (self-declared) citizens more than half consisted in duplicates 
and ‗form‘ responses. Id. at p.8 and 9. 
xiv European Commission. Public Consultation Document on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 
2001/37/EC. The need for a revision has also been highlighted by the European Parliament, the Member States and the 
stakeholders, as well as by the Commission itself in relation to its commitment to promote work on tobacco ingredients at 
the time of the adoption of the REACH Regulation. European Commission. Second Report on the Application of the 
Tobacco Products Directive. COM(2007) 754 final; 2007;  p.7 
18 
 
mandatory in their own jurisdictions.
xv
  
 
2. Secondly, plain packaging would enable the EU legislator to regulate packaging 
as an advertising tool, which seems to have become crucial since „tobacco 
packaging and product features are increasingly used to attract consumers, to 
promote products and brand image‟.xvi 
 
3. Thirdly, plain packaging could improve consumer information by preventing the 
existing TNCO quantitative labelling from being misread by consumers who 
might „think that lower levels indicate that a product is less risky to their health‟ 
and thus „decide to smoke or increase their consumption… in preference of 
quitting‟.xvii 
 
To sum up, the EU ascribed to plain packaging two well-defined policy roles in its tobacco 
control policy. Firstly, by overcoming existing regulatory divergence among tobacco 
products, it could have acted as an internal market-enhancer. Secondly, by detracting 
attention from packages and by preventing packaging from suggesting that some products are 
less harmful than others, it might also have served as a tool intended to prevent misleading 
marketing practices.  
 
 
5. Reactions to plain packaging in the Commission consultation of December 2010 
 
The consultation generated more than 85,000 contributions from a wide range of 
stakeholders, including citizens, industry, NGOs, governments and public authorities. The 
responses were carefully, yet slowly given their significant number, analysed and a report 
was prepared by DG SANCO. Respondents in favour of mandatory pictorial warnings and 
plain or generic tobacco packaging stressed that these measures would eliminate the 
advertising and marketing effects utilised by industry and would provide equal protection of 
European citizens. By contrast, the opponents to these measures argued that implementing 
mandatory pictorial warnings and generic packaging would have little to no impact on the 
uptake of smoking, especially among youth. Opponents also expressed legal concerns about 
intellectual property and suggested that generic and plain packaging could increase illicit 
trade in tobacco.
(55)
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
xv Yet, it is not clear whether plain packaging would supplement or replace the pictorial warnings. 
xvi European Commission. Public Consultation Document on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 
2001/37/EC. The need for a revision has also been highlighted by the European Parliament, the Member States and the 
stakeholders, as well as by the Commission itself in relation to its commitment to promote work on tobacco ingredients at 
the time of the adoption of the REACH Regulation. European Commission. Second Report on the Application of the 
Tobacco Products Directive. COM(2007) 754 final; 2007;  p.6 
xvii Ibid., p.7 
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6. Plain packaging in the Commission’s Proposal of 19 December 2012 
 
Despite much speculation about whether the EU would embrace plain packaging, the EU 
Commission eventually decided not to include this policy option in its proposal for a revised 
TPD. In order to understand the reasons that have led the Commission not to choose plain 
packaging as its preferred policy option, one has to examine the impact assessment 
accompanying the preparation of the Commission proposal. 
 
Impact assessment of the options relating to plain packaging in the Commission Proposal 
 
In this document, the Commission acknowledges that „also in the area of packaging and 
labelling, the disparities are expected to grow in coming years as Member States continue to 
take further measures, e.g. to adopt pictorial health warnings, introduce cessation 
information and/or further standardise tobacco packaging in line with the guidelines for 
implementing Articles 11 and 13 of the FCTC‟.(56) In particular, after examining the 
initiatives announced by the UK,
 xviii
 Ireland, Belgium, Finland and France in relation to these 
measures, it predicts that „it is likely that at least some of them will go forward at national 
level in the absence of a common EU approach‟. xix Moreover, the Commission highlights 
that Member States‘ interest in plain packaging is also reflected in a Council 
Recommendation of 2009 inviting the Commission to analyse the legal issues and the 
evidence base for the impact of plain packaging, including its effect on the functioning of the 
internal market.
(51)
 
 
In light of the above considerations, the Commission contemplated, in line with its original 
working document subject to public consultation, plain packaging as one of the policy 
options to be developed under the section „packaging and labelling‟. In this area of 
intervention, the Commission noted that the current provisions are outdated (e.g. size of the 
warnings, display of quantitative TNCO-values) and that there is heterogeneous development 
in Member States (e.g. pictorial warnings). It also recognised that there was a need to 
implement FCTC obligations and commitments; and to address the potential of packaging 
and labelling, firstly, to mislead consumers and, secondly, to encourage people to start or 
maintain smoking.  
 
To address these concerns, the Commission identified the following policy options:  
 
- Option 0: No change;xx  
- Option 1: Mandatory enlarged picture warnings;xxi  
                                                             
xviii See the first part of this Opinion for the a discussion of the measures envisaged by the UK 
xix Ibid 
xx That meant that current labeling rules were maintained, i.e. a general text warning of not less than 30% and an additional 
text warning of not less than 40%; Member States could choose to use a combined warning (picture and additional text 
warning) instead of the additional text warning (40%) 
xxi That meant combined warnings (picture plus text) of 75% displayed on both sides of the packages of tobacco products, 
presented in rotation. TNCO levels on the packages would have been replaced with descriptive information on content, 
emissions and risks. Display of cessation information (e.g. quit-lines, websites) is added to the packages. Tobacco products 
other than FMC and RYO would have been exempted. 
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- Option 2: Option 1 plus harmonise certain aspects of packets and prohibit promotional 
and misleading elements;
xxii
 
- Option 3: Option 2 plus „full plain packaging‟.(57) 
 
Both Options 2 and 3 imply the introduction of plain packaging in the EU but to a different 
extent. Option 2 would lead the EU to harmonise certain requirements for packages, such as 
cuboid shape, minimum number of factory manufactured cigarettes (FMC)
xxiii
 per package, 
and the size of the warnings; and it would allow the Member States to regulate „the area not 
regulated by the TPD or other Union legislation, including adopting provisions providing full 
standardisation of packaging of tobacco products (i.e. plain packaging) as far as these 
provisions are compatible with the Treaty‟. Option 3 would lead instead to the EU mandating 
„a standardised colour, font, size and position of brand name and brand variant on packages 
(plain packaging) and a readable health warning on each FMC stick‟. In other words, while 
Option 2 would allow Member States to adopt plain packaging as far as this is compatible 
with the EU internal market, Option 3 would lead to the adoption by the EU of a fully 
harmonised, EU-wide plain packaging scheme.  
 
After having assessed the economic, social and health impact of each of these policy options 
and compared their individual score one against the other, the Commission preferred Option 
2: the adoption of mandatory enlarged picture warnings alongside the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of packets and FMC appearance, whilst prohibiting promotional and 
misleading elements. 
 
Despite the more beneficial economic and health effects brought about by Option 3 (the 
introduction of EU-wide plain packaging) over Option 2,
(58)
 the EU Commission chose the 
latter. In its view, „full plain packaging (Policy Option 3) would be most effective in terms of 
removing national disparities‟, and would help to reduce administrative burdens by fully 
unifying labelling rules, whereas requiring mandatory pictorial warnings and/or harmonising 
certain aspects of the package shape and prohibiting promotional and misleading elements 
(Options 1 and 2) would contribute to a lesser extent to this objective. Most of the Member 
States responding to the public consultation were in favour of enlarged mandatory pictorial 
warnings, while the positions on plain packaging were more diverse. Overall, the 
Commission decided to opt for Option 2, which it considered – for the time being at least – 
the most appropriate policy option for the EU. 
 
The role of plain packaging in the Commission Proposal 
 
In line with the choices made in the impact assessment, the final proposal adopted by the 
                                                             
xxii That meant Option 1 plus: i) The tobacco labelling and packaging and the tobacco product itself could not include any 
promotional and misleading elements (e.g. misleading colours, symbols, slim FMC); ii) setting certain requirements for 
packages (e.g. cuboid shape, minimum number of and FMC per package) as well as for the size of the warnings Member 
States are allowed to regulate the area not regulated by the TPD or other Union legislation, including adopting provisions 
providing full standardisation of packaging of tobacco products (i.e. plain packaging) as far as these provisions are 
compatible with the Treaty. The Commission would report on experiences gained with respect to surfaces not governed by 
the TPD five years after the transposition of the TPD. 
xxiii This is a cigarette, produced by a tobacco manufacturer, capable of being smoked as such. 
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Commission
(59)
 mandates enlarged picture warnings and harmonises certain aspects of 
packets and FMC appearance, whilst prohibiting promotional and misleading elements. It 
also expressly recognises Member States‘ power „to regulate the area of the package not 
regulated by this Directive or other Union legislation‟. As a result of this proposal, tobacco 
packaging may become even more standardised, with plain packaging a possible result.
(60)
 
 
In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the publication of the proposed TPD, the 
Commission states:  
 
„Under the proposal, Member States would retain their power to regulate the area of 
the package not regulated by this Directive or other Union legislation, including 
implementing provisions providing full standardisation of packaging of tobacco 
products (including colours and font), as far as these provisions are compatible with 
the Treaty. The Commission will report on experiences gained with respect to 
surfaces not governed by the Directive five years after its transposition deadline.‟(61) 
 
This conclusion seems to be based upon the following two recitals included in the text of the 
legislative proposal: 
 
„(40) A Member State that deems it necessary to maintain more stringent national 
provisions for aspects falling inside the scope of this Directive should be allowed to 
do so, for all products alike, on grounds of overriding needs relating to the protection 
of public health. A Member State should also be allowed to introduce more stringent 
provisions, applying to all products alike, on grounds relating to the specific 
situation of this Member State and provided the provisions are justified by the need 
to protect public health. More stringent national provisions should be necessary and 
proportionate, not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States. Stricter national provisions require prior 
notification to, and approval from, the Commission taking into account the high 
level of health protection achieved through this Directive. 
 
(41) Member States should remain free to maintain or introduce national legislations 
applying to all products alike for aspects falling outside the scope of this Directive, 
provided they are compatible with the Treaty and do not jeopardise the full 
application of this Directive. Accordingly, Member States could, for instance, 
maintain or introduce provisions providing standardisation of packaging of tobacco 
products provided that those provisions are compatible with the Treaty, with WTO 
obligations and do not affect the full application of this Directive. A prior 
notification is required or technical regulations pursuant to Directive 98/34/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and 
on rules on Information Society services.‟ 
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According to the ordinary legislative procedure, this text was examined by the European 
Council and the European Parliament (EP), and both proposed amendments in relation to the 
policy option of plain packaging.
xxiv
 
 
 
7. The legislative process of the TPD and the plain packaging amendments  
 
On 12 September 2012 at the EP plenary meeting, an amendment proposed by Glenis 
Willmott and Linda McAvan (the EP rapporteur) on behalf of the S&D Group to introduce 
plain packaging (as well as further ingredients restrictions) was rejected.
xxv
 
 
The chronology and content of this amendment offers interesting insights. 
 
o On Monday 12 September 2012, individual political Groups in the EP decided to present 
draft motions for resolutions on European Union position and commitment in advance of 
the UN high-level meeting on the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases.
(62)
 
 
o On Tuesday 13 September 2012 two different motions were presented: 
 
 One signed by ALDE Group, S&D Group, Greens/EFAGroup, ECR Group, GUE/NGL 
Group. 
 
 One signed by EPP Group. 
 
o On Tuesday 13 September 2012, all political groups agreed on a draft joint motion for a 
resolution replacing the previous two. 
  
o The three above-mentioned draft resolutions did not include any reference to plain 
packaging as such, but referred to the FCTC and the TPD in general terms. 
 
o 8 amendments were then tabled to the joint resolution by individual MEPs on behalf of 
respective political Groups. 
 
o Amendment 1 signed by G. Willmott and L.  McAvan (S&D UK MEPs) proposed plain 
packaging, larger health warning label and ingredients restrictions. This was the proposed 
text: 
 
‘Emphasises the need for an immediate, effective revision of the Tobacco Products 
Directive, taking into account the European Union‟s commitment to the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control and the possibility of introducing standardised packaging 
                                                             
xxiv For information on the revision process of the TPD, see also the Commission‘s dedicated webpage 
xxv In particular the political Groups of the EPP, ECR, EFD, NI, part of Alde and of S&D opposed the proposal 
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and large pictorial health warnings for tobacco products and of restricting the use of 
certain additives‟ 
 
 
8. The political agreement of 18 December 2013: towards a new TPD  
 
Pending the vote in the EP Plenary and formal adoption by the Council, an agreement was 
reached at COREPER level on 18 December 2013. It was a direct outcome of the last 
trilogue between the EP and EU Member States on this text.  
 
Similarly to the EU Commission proposal (and notably Policy Option 2 of the impact 
assessment), the agreed text expressly allows Member States to introduce inter alia plain 
packaging. It must however be observed that it does so both in the preamble – as the 
Commission‘s proposal did – as well as in the text of the Directive.(59) 
 
The relevant recital provided as follows: 
  
„(40) Tobacco products and related products which comply with this Directive should 
benefit from the free movement of goods. However, in light of the different degrees of 
harmonisation achieved by this Directive, the Member States should retain, under 
certain conditions, the power to impose further requirements in certain respects to 
protect public health. This is the case in relation to the presentation and the 
packaging, including colours, of tobacco products other than health warnings, for 
which this Directive provides a first set of basic common rules.‟  
 
Accordingly, Member States could, for instance, introduce provisions providing for further 
standardisation of packaging of tobacco products provided that those provisions are 
compatible with the Treaty, with WTO obligations and do not affect the full application of 
this Directive. 
 
Article 24 translated this idea in prescriptive terms by stating: 
 
„2. This Directive shall not affect the right of a Member State to maintain and 
introduce further requirements, applicable to all products placed on its market, in 
relation to standardisation of packaging of tobacco products, where it is justified on 
grounds of public health, taking into account the high level of protection achieved 
through this Directive. Such measures shall be proportionate and may not constitute 
a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States. They shall be notified to the Commission together with the grounds 
for maintaining or introducing them.‟ 
 
 
9. The adopted revised EU TPD and plain packaging: the text of 26 February 2014 
adopted on 14 March 2014
(63)
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The text agreed in December 2013 was substantially upheld in the final revised TPD. In 
particular, Article 24 reads as follows: 
 
„Article 24 
 
Free movement 
 
1. Member States may not, for considerations relating to aspects regulated by this 
Directive, and subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, prohibit or restrict the 
placing on the market of tobacco or related products which comply with this 
Directive. 
 
2. This Directive shall not affect the right of a Member State to maintain or introduce 
further requirements, applicable to all products placed on its market, in relation to the 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products, where it is justified on grounds 
of public health, taking into account the high level of protection of human health 
achieved through this Directive. Such measures shall be proportionate and may not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States. Those measures shall be notified to the Commission together 
with the grounds for maintaining or introducing them.’ 
 
This is the provision that – together with the rules of the EU Treaties(64) – will help determine 
the legality of national schemes introducing inter alia standardised packaging. Therefore, in 
order to determine the compatibility of the UK draft Standardised Packaging of Tobacco 
Products Regulations with EU law, it is necessary to closely interpret this specific provision. 
 
While neither the EU legislator nor the EU judiciary have yet provided an interpretation of 
Article 24 of the revised TPD, an initial indication of how to interpret this provision can be 
found in the Q&A document that the Commission published on 26 February 2014. To the 
question „[c]an Member States introduce plain packaging?‟, the EU Commission provides 
the following response: „while the new rules mean that health warnings will cover a 
substantial part of the total surface of cigarette packages, a certain space will remain 
available for branding‟.xxvi 
 
Recital 53 of the preamble of the TPD clarifies the exact margin of discretion that is left to 
the Member States in disposing of this ―space‖. It states that: „…in light of the different 
degrees of harmonisation achieved by this Directive, the Member States should, under 
                                                             
xxvi Sir Cyril Chantler suggests in his report that although the terms ‗standardised packaging‘ and ‗plain packaging‘ are often 
used interchangeably, the ‗latter may involve fewer restrictions on, for example, size and shape of packs than fully 
standardised packaging‘. While this might be true in the future, the Australian example, by representing today the most 
standardised form of packaging in the world, is often equated with plain packaging. The EU documents accompanying the 
preparation of the TPD confirm this understanding. See, e.g. European Commission (2014): MEMO/14/134. Questions & 
Answers: New rules for tobacco products. (‗The new Directive specifically allows Member States to introduce further 
measures relating to standardisation of packaging or plain packaging‘). 
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certain conditions, retain the power to impose further requirements in certain respects in 
order to protect public health. This is the case in relation to the presentation and the 
packaging, including colours, of tobacco products other than health warnings, for which this 
Directive provides a first set of basic common rules‟. 
 
In line with Article 24, this recital reminds us of a general principle of EU law: in those areas 
in which the EU harmonisation is not full, Member States remain free to maintain or 
introduce ‘further requirements in certain respects’. Among the areas in which the 
Member States can take unilateral action within the framework of the current directive, 
the legislator mentions ‘the presentation and the packaging’ of tobacco products. As 
these are two areas in which the EU provides ‘a first set of basic common rules’, Member 
States are therefore allowed „to, for example, introduce provisions providing for further 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products, provided that those provisions are 
compatible with the TFEU, with WTO obligations and do not affect the full application of this 
Directive‟ .(65)  
This suggests that an EU Member State that decides to propose the introduction of a form of 
package standardisation that goes beyond the presentation and packaging requirements 
provided for the TPD (i.e. Chapter II of the TPD), will in principle be allowed to do so.  
Therefore, provided that it respects the conditions listed above, an individual Member State 
can determine not only the colour of the package but also its shape, surface and brand 
variants by thus further limiting the ability of the tobacco manufacturers to use the package as 
a „billboard‟.(66) Thus, for instance, while the EU TPD regulates the appearance of tobacco 
products by requiring a cuboid shape
(67)
 and prohibiting their resemblance to a food or 
cosmetic product,
(67)
 an EU Member State may further constrain the shape of the product, for 
example by banning inter alia the use of rounded or bevelled edges on packs. Although 
recital (28) TPD expressly authorises this feature – by judging it „acceptable‟ –, Article 14 
only prescribes a cuboid shape without providing any further indication in relation to the use 
of bevelled or rounded edges. In these circumstances, it is argued that – given the lack of 
legally binding nature of the recital of a directive – a Member State could validly limit this 
possibility by prohibiting bevelled and rounded edges, provided that it could comply with the 
requirements established by primary law and that will be illustrated in the following section. 
In short, the proposed prohibition – being restrictive to the free movement of tobacco 
products – must pursue a legitimate objective (presumably public health), non-discriminatory 
(it must apply to both imported and domestic products), proportionate (to its declared 
objective).  
 
Similarly, given that the EU TPD introduces a minimum number of cigarettes per pack („at 
least 20‟), a Member State may prohibit a higher number and in particular the option of 
additional, known in Australia as „loosie‟, cigarettes. This marketing strategy of including 
extra cigarettes for free has been used in Australia since the introduction of plain packaging 
accompanied by the use of variant names such as „+loosie‟. While variant names such as 
„Malboro+loosie‟ could be registered, their use could be prohibited as part of the national 
standardised packaging scheme. Likewise, the UK government could also, in line with 
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Article 13 of the TPD, expressly prohibit the use of other misleading branding names. In 
particular, it could prohibit the use of the terms „natural‟, „organic‟, „without additives‟, 
„without flavours‟ or „slim‟, as well as others such as „smooth‟, „gold‟ and „silver‟. This is 
true insofar as all these terms may encourage consumption by „creating an erroneous 
impression about its characteristics, health effects, risks or emissions‟. (67) In particular, in 
line with Article 13.1 lett. (b), they seem to suggest that „a particular tobacco product is less 
harmful than others or aims to reduce the effect of some harmful components of smoke or has 
vitalising, energetic, healing, rejuvenating, natural, organic properties or has other health or 
lifestyle properties‟. It is important to observe that the use of misleading terms on the package 
has been prohibited since the entry into force of the original TPD on 18 July 2001, but 
Member States may reiterate and further refine this prohibition by providing a list of 
prohibited brand names.  
 
In determining the compatibility of a national plain packaging scheme such as the one 
envisaged by the UK government, one therefore needs to determine whether, and under 
which conditions, a Member State may introduce ‘further requirements… in relation to the 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products’, including issues related to colour, 
shape, surface and brand variants. 
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III. The compatibility of the draft Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products 
Regulations with EU law  
 
In analysing the compatibility of the draft UK Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products 
Regulations with EU law, it is necessary to systematise the major packaging requirements 
they introduce by taking as a point of reference the TPD. 
 
The new TPD mandates that health warnings shall cover a substantial part of the total surface 
of tobacco packages. However, a certain space will remain available for branding these 
products. In particular, Article 10(1)(c) of the TPD requires that each unit packet and any 
outside packaging
xxvii
 of tobacco products shall carry combined health warnings covering 
65% of both the external front and back surface of the unit packet, and any outside 
packaging. The remaining 35% of the pack is therefore – under the newly adopted TPD – a 
space that can freely be used by the tobacco manufacturers to brand their products, subject to 
the limits set both by the provisions contained in the TPD itself and by the provisions of the 
EU Treaties.  
 
However, as foreseen in Article 24 of the TPD, tobacco manufacturers may have to comply 
with further requirements that could be introduced by Member States in relation to the 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products, subject to compliance with the EU 
Treaties, which could inter alia prevent them from making use of the remaining 35% of the 
package as they would wish. As discussed above, since the presentation and packaging of the 
tobacco products are aspects that have not been fully harmonised by the EU legislator, 
Member States enjoy a wide margin of manoeuvre in determining the degree – and related 
features – of the package standardisation which they intend to implement in their own 
jurisdiction. In particular, as expressly suggested by the preamble of the TPD, they are free to 
require the manufacturers to use a particular colour in the remaining space of the pack, as 
well as to determine further restrictions to the shape (e.g. bevelled edges) and size (e.g. 
prohibition of „+loosie‟) of the pack. That is where the major requirements for standardised 
packaging advanced by the UK find application:  pack colour (drab brown with a matt 
finish)
(68)
 and permitted text and features (font, colour, size of the brand and number of 
appearances of the brand variant).
(69)
 Yet the UK requirements for packaging standardisation 
do not only affect the remaining (35%) surface of the pack. The draft regulations introduce 
also further characteristics of the pack, such as surface (smooth without embossing), of the 
wrappers (which must be clear and transparent), of the inserts (which are prohibited) and the 
packs cannot make noise or produce a smell not normally associated with tobacco packaging. 
They also mandate a colour for the individual cigarettes (white with a cork effect or white tip) 
as well as specified typeface, size and location of their text indicating the brand name. 
 
All these requirements are additional to – and therefore go beyond – those mandated by the 
TPD and thus qualify as „further requirements‟ within the meaning of Article 24 of the TPD, 
                                                             
xxvii According to Recital 24 of the preamble of the TPD, ‗outside packaging‘ means any packaging in which tobacco or 
related products are placed on the market and which includes a unit packet or an aggregation of unit packets; transparent 
wrappers are not regarded as outside packaging. 
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with two sole exceptions: the shape of the pack
(70)
 and those prohibiting promotional or 
misleading labelling
(71)
 These requirements contained in the UK draft regulations seem to 
merely implement Article 13 and 14 of the TPD respectively. To minimize the burden for 
tobacco manufacturers, the UK government envisages the implementation of its requirements 
for standardised packaging in May 2016 to coincide with the transposition deadline for the 
TPD. 
 
While it is true that the new TPD specifically allows Member States to introduce further 
measures relating to the presentation and packaging of tobacco products such as those 
described above, such measures are subjected to a set of conditions on which the rest of our 
analysis focuses.  Even without such an explicit recognition, Member States would have been 
free to introduce stricter packaging rules, including standardised packaging requirements. 
Indeed, in areas of shared competence and in the absence of EU common, harmonised rules, 
Member States are, in principle, free to act provided they do so within the limits laid down in 
the EU Treaties. These limits largely coincide with the conditions that are enshrined in 
Article 24 of the TPD and constrain the freedom of Member States to introduce „further 
requirements‟, including plain packaging. We will therefore start discussing the scope of 
these conditions, before assessing whether other provisions of EU law may also limit the 
freedom of Member States, and the UK more specifically, to introduce measures intended to 
standardise the packaging of tobacco products on their territories. In so doing, we will be 
examining whether the UK requirements envisaged by Standardised Packaging of Tobacco 
Products Regulations are compatible with EU law. It should be noted, however, that the 
Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations will not suffice to implement the 
TPD as this requires a broader set of requirements for tobacco manufacturers that go beyond 
the presentation, packaging and sale of tobacco products for example with respect to rules on 
ingredients. 
 
 
1. The conditions listed in the TPD which Member States must comply with 
 
According to its Article 24(2), the newly adopted TPD „shall not affect the right of a Member 
State to maintain or introduce further requirements […] in relation to the standardisation of 
the packaging of tobacco products‟. However, the exercise of this prerogative is subject to 
respecting a set of conditions. In particular, the additional national requirements must: 
 
a. be „applicable to all products placed on its market‟; 
b. be „justified on grounds of public health, taking into account the high level of 
protection of human health achieved through this Directive‟; 
c. be proportionate; 
d. may not constitute „a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States‟; and 
e. „be notified to the Commission together with the grounds for maintaining or 
introducing them‟. 
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We propose to examine these conditions in turn, focusing specifically on the question 
whether the various requirements envisaged by Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products 
Regulations are compatible with those conditions laid down by EU law. In so doing, we will 
consider the evidence available in relation to the effectiveness of standardised packaging on 
public health by relying in particular on the Chantler Review. 
 
 
(a) Applicable to all products placed on its market 
 
By requiring that the introduction of plain packaging should apply to all tobacco products, 
irrespective of their origin, this condition is intended to avoid discrimination against imported 
goods in violation of Article 34 TFEU.
xxviii
 Its rationale therefore is to ensure that national 
products are not placed at a competitive advantage over imported products. 
 
The Philip Morris judgement
(72)
 delivered in September 2011 by the EFTA Court provides 
some guidance on this point.
(73)
 The central question in this case was whether the Norwegian 
ban on the display of tobacco product was in breach of the free movement of tobacco 
products. The Court held that, ‗by its nature‟, a visual display ban of tobacco products was 
not only liable to favour domestic products over imported ones, as consumers tend to be more 
familiar with the former,
(74)
 but also that such a discriminatory effect would be particularly 
significant with regards to the market penetration of new products.
(75)
 
 
Against this backdrop, one may wonder whether the introduction of a set of requirements 
aimed at standardising the packaging of tobacco products such as the one envisaged by the 
UK would be capable of producing similar effects. While it may appear prima facie true that 
any form of standardisation of the package that go beyond what the EU requires may 
crystallise the national market for tobacco products, by limiting the ability of lesser known 
products or new ones to thrive into that market, it must be observed that in the EU there is an 
increasingly passive market of tobacco products. While such products can still lawfully be 
placed on the EU market, the EU and its Member States nonetheless have a duty to regulate 
this market to steer existing and potential consumers away from smoking in light of the costs 
of smoking and existing evidence linking marketing and consumption patterns.
xxix
 In these 
circumstances, the argument could be made that a domestic standardised packaging scheme 
would apply equally to all tobacco products placed on the domestic market, that it would not 
favour home-manufactured cigarettes and that it would not therefore have any discriminatory 
effects towards imported products – thus satisfying the first condition listed in Article 24(2) 
of the revised TPD. Indeed, none of the requirements envisaged by Standardised Packaging 
of Tobacco Products Regulations, being applicable to all tobacco products, seems 
                                                             
xxviii Article 34 TFEU provides that ‗quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States‘. As is well-known, the Court has interpreted the scope of this provision particularly 
broadly in a long line of cases starting with its seminal Dassonville decision: measures having an equivalent effect cover all 
‗trading rules enacted by Member States, which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade‘: Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, at p.852. 
xxix  The obligation of the EU to take into account a high level of human health protection in the definition and 
implementation of all its policies is strongly enshrined in the Treaties: see in particular Articles 9, 114(3) and 168(1) TFEU 
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discriminatory in nature. Given their limited use,
(76)
 the exemption provided for cigars and 
pipe tobacco does not alter this conclusion.  
 
 
(b) Justified on grounds of public health 
 
According to Article 24(2) of the revised TPD, a Member State may only introduce national 
measures which are „justified on grounds of public health, taking into account the high level 
of protection of human health achieved through this Directive‟. The exact significance of this 
provision is not particularly straightforward. One could distinguish two elements.  
 
Firstly, it refers to national measures which must be justified on grounds on public health. 
This is a classical free movement statement: if Member States introduce national measures 
which restrict the free movement of goods, these measures must be justified by a mandatory 
requirement, i.e. a public interest of sufficient importance to satisfy the CJEU or a national 
court that it can provide a ground for derogating from the fundamental principle of free 
movement. Member States must also adduce evidence that the measure is proportionate, as 
discussed below. Public health has been one of the most often invoked grounds of derogation 
by Member States, when defending national measures challenged on the basis that they 
infringed the general free movement provisions of the EU Treaties, and Article 34 on the free 
movement of goods and Article 56 on the free movement of services more specifically. 
 
At the same time, however, Article 24(2) of the revised TPD refers to the obligation resting 
on the EU to take a high level of public health protection in the definition and the 
implementation of all its policies.
(63)
 This „mainstreaming‟ obligation implies, at its core, that 
the EU should not pursue a high level of public health protection only via ear-marked, 
distinct policies, but that it must do so systematically via all its policy areas, including the 
internal market, as clearly stated in Article 114(3) TFEU.
xxx
 The TPD, both in its original and 
revised versions, has at its heart a high level of public health protection. In particular, and as 
discussed above, it is intended to create a more passive market in tobacco products in order to 
reduce smoking rates across the EU, and in particular the uptake of smoking by children and 
young people. 
 
One way of reconciling the two sections of the provision under review is to discuss the extent 
to which Member States are allowed to exceed the level of public health protection mandated 
by the EU TPD by adopting supplementary measures on their territories, such as the 
imposition of a plain packaging or other forms of packaging standardisation of tobacco 
products. If so, the answer seems to be rather straightforward: the Impact Assessment Report 
which the Commission published alongside its proposal for a revised TPD, clearly 
acknowledges that plain packaging has the potential to increase public health outcomes.
(56)
 
Even though the EU may not have been in a position to choose the option which would have 
                                                             
xxx On the mainstreaming of public health concerns at EU level, see A. Garde, EU Law and Obesity Prevention (Kluwer Law 
International, 2010), at p. 73. 
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led to the imposition of a full plain EU-wide packaging scheme (Option 3) – a high level of 
protection does not mean the „highest‟ level of public health protection – this should not 
necessarily mean that Member States could not impose a plain packaging scheme on their 
territories: Article 24(2) clearly suggests otherwise (subject to the national measures in 
question being proportionate).  
 
The Impact Assessment undertaken by the UK on its draft regulations unequivocally 
establishes the public health objectives which are being pursued. It states that: ―Research 
evidence suggests that standardised packaging of tobacco products would contribute to the 
Government‘s public health policy objectives by reducing the appeal of cigarettes, packs and 
brands, increasing the salience of health warnings, making perceptions of product harm and 
strength more accurate and reshaping smoking-related attitudes, beliefs, intentions and 
behaviour.
(77)
 In other words, standardised packaging is capable of contributing to the 
attainment of the public health objective through a sub-set of goals: reduced attractiveness of 
the pack, increased salience of warnings, enhanced perception of harm. Each of these 
elements act as a proxy which proves the suitability of standardised packaging to attain its 
legitimate objective: public health. In the very same document, the UK government also 
demonstrates that all impacts have been considered and the measures proposed are therefore 
proportionate.
(78)
 
 
 
(c) Be proportionate 
 
Member State action that departs or goes beyond what the EU requires, such as would be the 
case if the UK introduced standardised packaging on its territory, must satisfy a 
proportionality test which is similar to the test applied to EU-wide measures. According to 
established case law, an act is proportionate when it is suitable and necessary to achieve its 
declared goal.
 (79)
 In particular, the principle of proportionality requires: 
 
o that measures adopted should not exceed the limits of what is suitable or appropriate 
in order to attain the legitimate objective pursued by the legislation in question 
(suitability limb); and 
 
o where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, that recourse must be 
had to the least onerous method (necessity limb). 
 
Because of the potentially disruptive effect that national measures may have on the EU 
internal market, EU courts tend to engage in a more intensive review when determining 
whether restrictive measures adopted by a Member State are suitable or necessary than when 
examining the proportionality of EU action.
xxxi
 Moreover, unlike what would occur should 
EU courts examine the legality of an EU-wide plain packaging scheme under EU law, 
                                                             
xxxi See, on this point, A. Alemanno, The Shaping of EU Risk Regulation by EC Courts (Jean Monnet Working Paper 
18/2008); P. Craig, EU Adminstrative Law, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2012), at p. 688-689 and 704-706. 
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national standardised packaging schemes would be examined solely in light of the objective 
of protecting public health under both the suitability and necessity tests. This is likely to lead 
the interpreter, be it the CJEU or a national court applying EU law, to engage in a closer 
analysis of the effectiveness of plain packaging in reducing tobacco consumption. 
 
However, although the burden of proof bears on the acting Member State who has to adduce 
evidence or data in support of the contested measure, the national authorities cannot – in 
principle – „be deprived of the possibility of establishing that an internal restrictive measure 
satisfies those requirements, solely on the ground that that Member State is not able to 
produce studies serving as the basis for the adoption of the legislation at issue‟.(80) This 
would seem to suggest that, despite a more intrusive standard of judicial review, national 
measures should still survive, at least in principle, the proportionality scrutiny even in the 
absence of „hard‟ evidence supporting them. This argument finds support in light of the 
existing evidence supporting the effectiveness of standardised packaging. While Sir Cyril 
Chantler conceded in his Review that no evidence allowed him „to quantify the size of the 
likely impact of standardised packaging‟, he concluded that it „is very likely to lead to a 
modest but important reduction over time on the uptake and prevalence of smoking‟.(81) The 
Impact Assessment
(12)
performed by the UK government made an attempt at quantifying the 
net benefit stemming from the proposed standardised packaging. While conceding that 
„quantification of the likely scale of the impact on smoking take up and prevalence is difficult 
in the absence of directly comparable precedents‟, it stated that „there is experience in the 
UK and internationally of other tobacco control interventions, particularly those involving 
tobacco advertising, promotion and marketing to provide insight into expected impacts of 
introducing standardised packaging‟. In particular, independent academic research was 
commissioned by UK Department of Health to gather an expert view on the likely scale of 
impact of standardised packaging from a range of tobacco control experts from around the 
world. The consensus (based on the median of reported views) of these experts is that the 
intervention would be expected to generate after two years: 
 
o a decline in the proportion of 11-15 year olds who have ever smoked of three 
percentage points (from a baseline of 27% at the time of the research); and 
 
o a decline in adult smoking prevalence of one percentage point (from a baseline of 
21% at the time of the research), as more people find themselves able to quit. 
 
By relying upon the TPD Impact Assessment,
(82)
 the UK Impact Assessment estimates that 
around one tenth of this gain might plausibly be achieved by the TPD without standardised 
packaging. The rest of the gain provides our central estimate of the incremental gain 
attributable to standardised packaging. 
 
The two limbs of the proportionality test are considered in turn and applied to the UK‘s 
proposal to standardise the packaging of tobacco products. 
 
Suitability  
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Under the first limb of the proportionality test, the question is whether a given intervention is 
suited to attain its declared objective. In the case of plain packaging, the objective pursued by 
the UK will be public health. More specifically, underlying the Government‘s choice will be 
the aim to decrease tobacco initiation among young people by reducing the attractiveness of 
tobacco products. Regardless of the exact objective adduced by the relevant Member State 
when choosing it, the suitability assessment of a national plain packaging scheme is set to 
lead the interpreter to assess the measure‘s effectiveness in achieving its public health 
objective.  
 
Several difficulties exist when scrutinising the suitability of any public health intervention. 
This is mainly due to the difficulty in establishing a causal link between the resulting 
packaging and its expected outcome. The most direct experiment to test the actual impact of 
standardised packaging on the uptake of smoking amongst children would be a randomised 
controlled trial, i.e. a comparison of the uptake of smoking in children exposed to cigarettes 
in non-standardised branded packaging and in standardised packaging to see which group had 
the greatest propensity to take up smoking. However, to do so would require not only a 
suitably large and isolated population free of known confounding factors that influence 
smoking and prevalence, but also to expose a randomised group of children to nicotine 
exposure and possible addiction.
(83)
 As Sir Chantler clearly stated, such an approach is neither 
possible nor ethical: „given the highly addictive and harmful nature of smoking, such an 
experiment could, rightly, never receive ethical approval.‟(84) 
 
These difficulties are further compounded by the fact that any of the public health objectives 
previously mentioned (e.g. reduction of tobacco initiation, tobacco prevalence, public health 
gains) cannot be pursued by individual measures taken in isolation. There is no „silver bullet‟ 
in tobacco control: only a multi-sectoral policy may help facilitate tobacco prevention, which 
makes the effectiveness of a specific intervention all the more difficult – if not impossible – 
to quantify.
(85)
 Therefore, the contribution which a plain packaging scheme could make to 
public health objectives should not be assessed in isolation: it should be considered as part of 
a coherent set of measures which the Department of Health has elected to adopt as part of its 
2011 Tobacco Control Plan for England, including bans on the display of tobacco products at 
points of sale, increased taxation on tobacco products, public health campaigns, as well as 
other tobacco control measures included in the Children and Families Act such as making 
proxy purchasing an offence. 
 
The EFTA Court, when called upon to assess the suitability of visual display ban of tobacco 
products at point of sale, held in its Philip Morris decision that „where the EEA State 
concerned legitimately aims for a very high level of protection, it must be sufficient for the 
authorities to demonstrate that, even though there may be some scientific uncertainty as 
regards the suitability and necessity of the disputed measure, it was reasonable to assume 
that the measure would be able to contribute to the protection of human health‟.(73) As a 
result of the introduction of such an innovative approach to the suitability analysis of the 
contested measure, any court interpreting EU law, be it that of a Member State or of the EU, 
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should grant a wide margin of manoeuvre to Member States in selecting the tobacco control 
measures it wishes to implement, including plain packaging, even though their effects cannot 
be conclusively established. This case law is particularly relevant to the case of plain 
standardised packaging insofar as this measure has been applied to date for a limited period 
of time and only in one jurisdiction (Australia).
xxxii
 In any event – in light of the reasons 
discussed above, its effectiveness in reducing consumption is difficult to demonstrate 
conclusively.
(86)
 Moreover, it is well known that the effect of any form of public health 
intervention tends to appear gradually and over time. More critically, the specific effects of 
health control policy are difficult to discern from those stemming from the overall policy. In 
these circumstances, any court should recognise – as the EFTA Court did in its Philip Morris 
decision – some general ability of a given policy tool to achieve its public health objective. It 
is suggested that the Court should check the reasoning put forward by a Member State to 
justify its national measure, without however substituting its assessment to that of the 
national legislature too readily in fields as complex as public health protection, and tobacco 
control more specifically.
(87)
  
 
Necessity 
 
The second limb of the proportionality test implies an inquiry into the necessity of the 
measure adopted by the Member State: it cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve its 
declared objective.
(88)
 In practical terms, the necessity limb requires verification of whether 
there could be less restrictive measures that also achieve the declared goal. If these alternative 
policy options are available, the relevant Member State is bound to choose the least intrusive 
of all equally effective means. This examination inevitably requires a comparative analysis 
between the measure under examination and other policy options available. In a sector such 
as public health, this analysis is extremely difficult to carry out in light of the holistic 
approach which is required from competent public authorities. Which policy options should 
be considered? How should they be measured and compared, and with reference to what 
benchmark, when assessing the necessity of the chosen measure? Can it be said that the 
proposed standardised packaging scheme is the only measure that appears appropriate to cope 
with the danger posed by tobacco use, particularly by young people? Are there other forms of 
standardised packaging that could achieve the same level of protection while being less 
intrusive of tobacco manufacturers? 
 
As previously discussed, the European Commission addresses this sort of questions when 
conducting an Impact Assessment of its proposals. In the case at hand, the Commission 
decided not to require plain packaging only after having examined all policy options which 
could be adopted at the EU level, including plain packaging. One may therefore wonder to 
what extent the policy options identified and the evidence gathered for each of them by the 
Commission may shape the necessity assessment by the interpreter.
 
While EU Courts already 
refer to the analysis contained in an Impact Assessment when they are called upon to 
                                                             
xxxii According to the Chantler Review, comprehensive surveys showing changes in prevalence since the introduction of 
plain packaging in Australia are not yet available. A survey from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare is expected 
to report results of overall prevalence in October 2014 and estimates for youth prevalence are expected in August 2015. 
35 
 
examine the necessity of an EU measure,
(89)
 it is not clear whether they could rely on the very 
same evidence when called upon to verify the necessity of a national measure. In our view, it 
is likely that EU Courts, should they be called upon to examine the necessity of any national 
standardised packaging scheme, may take the Commission‘s Impact Assessment into account 
in determining how that measure scores as compared to other policy options. It appears less 
likely that EU Courts will consider the impact assessment performed by the United Kingdom 
to support its measure. This is true for at least two reasons. First, the requirements for 
standardised packaging envisaged by the UK substantially overlap with those the 
Commission examined in its Impact Assessment, which may therefore offer a useful analysis. 
Second, the UK impact assessment does not explicitly examine – unlike the one performed 
by the EU – the proportionality of the policy option considered.(90) At the same time, one 
must consider that also the EU Impact Assessment of standardised packaging falls short of 
providing a complete analysis. It only focuses on the impacts of the different policy options, 
including plain packaging, on the assumption that they could be adopted at EU level, not by a 
Member State. While it is obvious that the scale of their effects may change, it is submitted 
that the evidence gathered in relation to their individual ability to achieve the declared 
objective could be useful also in relation to the UK requirements.  
 
Thus, should EU Courts refer to the Impact Assessment Report accompanying its proposal 
for a revised TPD, they will find that standardised packaging promises important health 
benefits, whilst its economic effects remain difficult to determine.
(91)
 In its Impact 
Assessment, the Commission highlighted the many benefits that plain packaging may bring 
about in terms of health gains as compared to other policy options involving less 
standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products. In particular, it explicitly recognises 
that „although no studies based on real life experiences are available at this stage, many 
recent studies indicate that plain packaging not only increases the noticeability and 
effectiveness of health warnings, but also reduces substantially the attractiveness and appeal 
of tobacco packaging, the product, particular brands, and smoking (both to smokers and 
potential smokers) as well as false beliefs about the risks associated with different brand 
variants‟.(92) As a consequence, the study concludes that „plain packaging may help to reduce 
tobacco consumption and smoking prevalence, in particular by discouraging young people 
from taking up smoking, by reducing tobacco consumption among young adult smokers‟.(93)   
 
Yet, the necessity test does not require the policymaker to choose the most effective policy 
option in achieving its declared goal. Rather, it is its cost-effectiveness when measured 
against other policy options that determines whether the chosen policy option, i.e. 
standardised packaging, is necessary to attain its objective. In determining the cost-
effectiveness of a national standardised packaging scheme, one has to consider a dimension 
that was inevitably lacking from the Impact Assessment: its limited territorial nature (i.e. the 
UK and not the EU). The costs of a national standardised packaging scheme may disrupt – to 
some extent at least – the functioning of the internal market: tobacco products will have to be 
specifically packaged for the UK market, thus hindering the free movement of goods across 
the EU. However, in establishing the necessity of standardised packaging, the interpreter may 
suggest that, given the current circumstances characterising the EU market for tobacco 
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products (i.e. a passive market), a standardised packaging scheme is arguably necessary to 
achieve its objective.
(94)
 Moreover, the UK may also insist on its duties and obligations as 
they derive from its commitments under the FCTC (as it did in its proposal), which explicitly 
encourages its parties to implement inter alia standardised packaging.
xxxiii
 Finally, the 
interpreter may also decide to assess the necessity of the proposed standardised packaging not 
only as a single measure but also as one component of a wider legislative intervention, 
including for instance the criminalisation of proxy purchasing and other measures, as 
discussed above.  In so doing, it may want to refer to the Impact Assessment accompanying 
the UK proposal. 
 
 
(d) Not a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States 
 
This condition overlaps with the first condition, namely that the measure must be applicable 
to all products placed on the Member State‘s market. On the basis of the analysis we have 
provided above, we conclude that the introduction of a standardised packaging scheme on 
tobacco products in the UK would fulfil this condition and would not constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States: the 
scheme would apply equally to all tobacco products, irrespective of their origin.  
 
 
(e) Be notified to the Commission 
 
The modalities of the notification to the Commission of the „further requirements […] in 
relation to the standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products‟ are defined in the 
adopted TPD. In the absence of a more specific procedure, the relevant Member State is 
subject to the notification regime established by Directive 98/34.
(95)
  
 
Directive 98/34 sets up a procedure which imposes an obligation on Member States to notify 
to the Commission and to each other all the draft technical regulations concerning products as 
well as Information Society Services before they are adopted in national law. As such 
regulations could create unjustified barriers to the free movement of goods between Member 
States, their notification in draft form and subsequent evaluation of their content in the course 
of the procedure may promote transparency and control with regard to those regulations.
xxxiv
 
As the CJEU has confirmed, Directive 98/34 has a general aim of „eliminating or restricting 
obstacles to trade, to inform other States of technical regulations envisaged by a State, to 
give the Commission and the other Member States time to react and to propose amendments 
for lessening restrictions to the free movement of goods arising from the envisaged measure 
and to afford the Commission time to propose a harmonising directive‟.(96) Moreover, the 
wording of the directive is clear that it provides for a procedure for EU control of draft 
                                                             
xxxiii This is discussed more fully in the first part of this opinion 
xxxiv See Recitals 2 to 10 of the Preamble of the EU TPD 
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national regulations whose date of their entry into force is made subject to the Commission‘s 
agreement or lack of opposition.
(97)
 
 
A proposal to adopt standardised packaging constitutes a draft technical specification subject 
to the notification requirement under the provisions of Directive 98/34. In effect, a „technical 
specification‟ is defined as „a specification contained in a document which lays down the 
characteristics required of a product […] including the requirements applicable to the 
product as regards […] packaging, marking or labelling […]‟.(97) 
 
Importantly for our purposes, the CJEU has held that a breach of the obligation to notify 
renders the technical regulations concerned inapplicable, so that they are unenforceable 
against individuals.
(96)
 It is therefore important that any standardised packaging measures the 
UK is considering notifying to the Commission should be in accordance with the provisions 
of Directive 98/34 if these measures are to be successfully applied and enforced against 
tobacco industry operators on the national territory.  
 
 
2. Other legality concerns relating to the interaction between EU law and national law 
 
(a) EU Trademark Law 
 
All forms of standardisation of the package of tobacco products, including plain packaging, 
raise significant legal concerns in relation to intellectual property rights, notably trademark 
law.
(98)
 This is all the more true for plain packaging, such as that envisaged by the UK 
government, as it entails the removal not only of all the design elements typically displayed 
on cigarette packs, but also of the use of the characterising features of brand names (e.g. 
„Marlboro‟, „Camel‟…). In particular, it requires that the distinctive typeface, colour and font 
size of tobacco signs, which tobacco manufacturers typically register all these signs as 
trademarks, be replaced by a standard plain format.  
 
Article 2 of Directive 2008/95 („Trademark Directive‟)(99) provides that „a trade mark may 
consist of any signs capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including 
personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, 
provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings‟.(100) An analogous provision is contained in 
Article 4 of Regulation 207/2009 („Trademark Regulation‟).(101) 
 
Given the likelihood that these EU trademark provisions could be invoked to oppose the 
introduction of a tobacco control measure such as standardised packaging, the following 
paragraphs analyse the compatibility of the Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products 
Regulations with EU trademark law.   
 
The UK plain packaging scheme may raise the following three legal concerns: 
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o it may jeopardise the main function of trademarks; 
o it may infringe trademark‘s rights; and 
o it may infringe the unitary character of trademark. 
 
Does plain packaging jeopardise the main function of trademarks? 
 
Trademarks make it easier for the public to take educated purchase decisions. It is for this 
reason that, in order to be registrable, trademarks should effectively distinguish the goods or 
services of one company from those of other companies.
(102)
 This has been recognised by the 
EU courts as well as by the decision practice of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market („OHIM‟).(103) 
 
This fundamental function may be threatened should trademarks not be visible, or even 
available, to consumers when selecting a product. This is exactly what standardised 
packaging – as set out in the requirements proposed by the UK government – would create, 
as all of the distinctive elements displayed on the box would be removed. This new measure 
may therefore threaten consumers‘ ability to make reasoned choices, as there would be little 
difference — besides the brand names — between the different cigarette boxes marketed by 
tobacco companies. 
 
The concerns related to the loss of distinctiveness appear heightened if examined in the light 
of CJEU findings made in proceedings involving the legality of the TPD. In this case the 
CJEU was called upon to examine the extent to which the prohibition of descriptors such as 
„light‟, „ultra-light‟, „low-tar‟ and „mild‟ could infringe the fundamental right to property, 
including intellectual property and trademark rights. After confirming that this provision 
prohibits the use of trademarks incorporating the above descriptors, the Court noted that 
tobacco producers may continue using other distinctive signs on the packs. In particular, it 
held that „[w]hile that article entails prohibition, in relation only to the packaging of tobacco 
products, on using a trade mark incorporating one of the descriptors referred to in that 
provision, the fact remains that a manufacturer of tobacco products may continue, 
notwithstanding the removal of that description from the packaging, to distinguish its product 
by using other distinctive signs‟.(104) According to an a contrario interpretation of this 
finding, it may seem that a measure that does not allow tobacco producers to use signs 
capable of distinguishing their products might negatively impact on the main function of their 
trademarks.
(105)
 
 
Yet the above finding could not be invoked to claim that standardised packaging is not 
compliant with EU trademark law. The distinctiveness of a trademark is relevant when it 
comes to granting registration, with the result that signs devoid of distinctive character will 
not be protected.
(102)
 However, this does not mean that public law measures that have a 
negative impact on the distinctive character of already registered trademarks are necessarily 
contrary to EU law as there is not a general prohibition on restricting the use of distinctive 
elements under EU law. The UK proposal expressly states that the standardisation 
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requirements that it puts forward do not affect the ability to register trademarks and designs 
for tobacco products.
(106)
 
 
Does plain packaging infringe trademark rights? 
 
In order to determine if standardised packaging is contrary to EU trademark law, it is 
necessary to investigate if and to what extent it encroaches upon the rights offered by 
trademark registration. Article 5 of the Trademark Directive and Article 9 of the Trademark 
Regulation lay down the scope of protection given by a trademark registration. It is generally 
believed that these provisions do not offer their owners a positive right to use the protected 
sign, but a negative right to prevent third parties from using it.
(107)
 Indeed, the right to use a 
sign does not arise from registration at all, but from the freedom to carry out commercial 
activities in the market.
(108)
 As a matter of fact any person interested in trading is free to start 
using trademarks for distinguishing his or her products and services, provided that such signs 
do not infringe upon earlier exclusive rights owned by third parties.   
 
This reading is disputed by some commentators, who consider it too formalistic: by 
permitting a right of registration but at the same time denying a right of use — it is argued — 
such an interpretation may annihilate the whole aim of registration, which is to offer owners a 
right of exclusive use.
(109)
 Yet the above disputed reading was endorsed by Advocate General 
Geelhoed in his Opinion on the validity of the TPD, where he stated that:  
 
„[T]he essential substance of a trademark right does not consist in an entitlement as against 
the authorities to use a trademark unimpeded by provisions of public law. On the contrary, a 
trademark right is essentially a right enforceable against other individuals if they infringe the 
use made by the holder‟.(109) 
 
Following this interpretation, it would seem that standardised packaging — which would be 
implemented by „provisions of public law‟ — would not breach trademark rights as it does 
not authorise third parties to exploit tobacco signs, but merely consists of a restriction on 
right owners‘ ability to use their own signs. Despite the loss of distinctiveness of tobacco 
trademarks, rights holders could still exercise the right to prohibit the misappropriation of 
their signs by unauthorised third parties.  
 
Thus, the fact that trademark rights are essentially negative rights under EU law should 
permit Member States, including the UK, to pursue and adopt public policies, such as 
measures aimed at protecting public health. The validity of this conclusion finds further 
support in the WTO Panel in the EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications 
(Australia),
(110)
 a case opposing the US and the EU regarding the former‘s coexistence regime 
between geographical indications and trademarks.
xxxv
 In that case, the Panel held that a 
„fundamental feature of intellectual property protection inherently grants Members freedom 
                                                             
xxxv The EU and its Member States are WTO Members and thus they must respect WTO agreements including TRIPS and 
the interpretations given by WTO adjudicatory bodies 
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to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain those public 
policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an 
exception under the TRIPS Agreement‟.(110)  
 
The unitary effect of Community trademark law 
 
A final concern raised by the introduction of any form of standardisation of the package, 
including that advanced by the UK, relates to one of the main principles of EU trademark 
law: the so-called „unitary effect‟ of the Community Trademark. According to this principle, 
the EU trademark is a unique title granted by the Office for the Harmonization in the Internal 
Market that is valid in all the twenty-eight EU Member States. According to this principle, as 
enshrined in Article 1(2) of the Trademark Regulation,
(111)
 a Community Trademark has ‗an 
equal effect throughout the Community: it shall not be registered, transferred or surrendered 
or be the subject of a decision revoking the rights of the proprietor or declaring it invalid, nor 
shall its use be prohibited, save in respect of the whole Community‘.xxxvi In other words, the 
Community Trademark consists of a unique title that is valid in all 28 Member States, 
meaning that its use cannot – in principle – be prohibited in individual countries. The 
introduction of standardised packaging requirements at a national level, by preventing or 
limiting the use of Community Trademarks in some Member States but not others, might 
clash with the unitary character of the Community Trademark system. Article 22 of the 
Trademark Regulation provides for a sole exception to this principle by stating that a 
Community Trademark may be licensed for the whole or part of the Union. Although the 
Trademark Regulation does not foresee other exceptions to the principle of unitary effect 
allowing individual Member States to prohibit the use of Community Trademarks licensed 
for the EU as a whole, it is argued that this does not automatically imply that standardised 
packaging violates this principle and, should this be the case, that this principle could not 
suffer from other derogations. One must observe that standardised packing does not amount 
to a total prohibition of the trademark, but merely to a restriction to its use in on the tobacco 
products‘ packs. Moreover, Article 110(2) of the Community Trademark – by foreseeing the 
possibility to limit the use of a EU trademark in one or more EU Member States 
xxxvii
 – seems 
to suggest that it is actually possible to limit the unitary character of the EU trademark.
(112)
 
 
In these circumstances, it is submitted that the unitary character of the EU trademark does not 
represent an obstacle to the introduction of a standardised packaging by an individual 
Member State, such as the UK. 
 
 
(b) EU fundamental rights 
 
                                                             
xxxvi This provision applies unless otherwise provided in the Trademark Regulation (see Recital 3). 
xxxvii This provision reads as follow: This Regulation shall, unless otherwise provided for, not affect the right to bring 
proceedings under the civil, administrative or criminal law of a Member Sate or under provisions of Community law for the 
purpose of prohibiting the use of a Community trade mark to the extent that the use of a national trade mark may be 
prohibited under the law of that Member State or under Community law. 
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The EU is „founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights‟.(113) As a result, the EU and its Member States 
when interpreting, applying or implementing EU law must comply with fundamental rights. 
More specifically, Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union identifies three main sources of 
EU fundamental rights: the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter), the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and the general 
principles of EU law resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States.  
 
Virtually all attempts of tobacco manufacturers to challenge the legality of EU and national 
tobacco control measures have been accompanied by the invocation of a breach of their 
fundamental rights. In particular, tobacco manufacturers have argued that EU and/or national 
measures regulating the content, presentation (including the packaging and the labelling), 
advertising or promotion of their products infringe several of the fundamental rights they 
derive from EU and/or national law, not least: the freedom of expression and information, the 
freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work, the freedom to conduct a 
business, and the right to property.
(114)
 All these rights are protected by the EU legal order. 
Nevertheless, none of them is absolute: they may be restricted on grounds of public health 
protection.
(115)
 The CJEU has granted a particularly broad margin of discretion to the EU and 
the national legislatures in deciding which measures should be put in place as part of the EU 
and national tobacco control strategies. This is not to suggest, however, that policy makers 
can dispense with the proportionality assessment involved in balancing competing rights 
against each other.   
 
The right to property and the freedom to conduct a business 
 
The right to property and the freedom to conduct a business are often invoked in tandem. In a 
consistent line of decisions delivered before the EU Charter became legally binding, the 
CJEU highlighted that neither of those rights constituted an unfettered prerogative but had to 
be viewed in light of their social function. They could therefore be restricted provided that the 
restrictions imposed corresponded to objectives of general interest pursued by the EU; and 
that they did not constitute, as regards the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference with the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed.
(116)
 The Court 
unequivocally applied these principles in the British American Tobacco judgment where it 
rejected any suggestion that the EU had unlawfully interfered with the right to property of 
tobacco manufacturers and their freedom to pursue a trade or profession by adopting the 
TPD:  
 
„As regards the validity of the Directive in respect of the right to property […] the 
only effect produced by Article 5 of the Directive is to restrict the right of 
manufacturers of tobacco products to use the space on some sides of cigarette packets 
to show their trademarks without prejudicing the substance of their trade mark rights, 
the purpose being to ensure a high level of health protection when the obstacles 
created by national laws on labelling are eliminated.‘(117)  
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The Court also emphasised that imposing a limitation on the freedom to trade and pursue a 
profession was no more than the consequence of the restriction upon the exercise of the right 
to property, so that the two restrictions merged. Thus, the reasons justifying the restriction 
upon the manufacture and distribution of tobacco products were the same as those justifying 
the restrictions placed upon the use of property. Moreover, as EU institutions enjoy a margin 
of discretion in the choice of the means needed to achieve their policies, traders are unable to 
claim that they have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of 
being altered by decisions taken by those institutions within the limits of their discretionary 
power will be maintained. In particular, no informed trader is entitled to expect that patterns 
of trade will be respected.
(118)
 Finally, by virtue of the principle of proportionality, measures 
imposing financial charges on economic operators are lawful provided that the measures are 
appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation 
in question.
(119)
 
 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court has maintained this approach, 
except that it relies directly on the EU Charter rather than on the unwritten general principles 
of EU law.
xxxviii
 
 
In light of the Court‘s case law, tobacco manufacturers affected by tobacco control measures 
are unlikely to succeed in their claims if they submit that their fundamental right to property, 
including intellectual property, and fundamental freedom to pursue their business are 
infringed because they have to bear some of the economic burden of measures imposed to 
restrict tobacco use. Therefore, should the UK impose the standardised packaging of tobacco 
products, preventing the use of brands on tobacco products, it is arguable that the very 
substance of the right to property and the freedom to trade would not be affected.
xxxix
 
Tobacco manufacturers would continue to benefit from the protection that intellectual 
property law offers traders from the unauthorised use of their trademarks by third parties.
(120)
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
xxxviii For a recent example of how the Court balances competing interests when invoking the EU Charter, and in particular 
Article 16 (freedom to conduct a business) and Article 17 (right to property), see Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich [2013] ECR 
I-28. In this judgment, the Grand Chamber confirmed that the EU legislature was entitled to give priority, in the necessary 
balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to overriding requirements of public interests over private economic interests, 
on the condition that the restriction was proportionate, i.e. that a fair balance had been struck between several rights and 
fundamental freedoms protected by the EU legal order with a view to reconciling them (at paragraph 60). On the facts of the 
case, the Court concluded that the EU legislature could limit the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property ‗to 
give priority, in the necessary balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access to information over contractual 
freedom‘ (at paragraph 66). See by analogy in relation to alcoholic beverages, Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor [2012] 
ECR I-526. 
xxxix Article 52(1) of the EU Charter requires that ‗any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised  by 
this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms‘, thus recognising that there 
are ‗limitations on limitations‘ to fundamental rights and freedoms under the ‗essential core‘ doctrine: any limitation on 
fundamental rights – even proportionate ones – must never undermine the ‗very substance‘ of a fundamental right. This sets 
an absolute limit to all governmental power by identifying an ‗untouchable‘ core within a right. However, the role of this 
doctrine remains unclear in EU law: R. Schütze, EU Constitutional Law (CUP, 2012), at p.419. 
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Freedom of expression 
 
Tobacco manufacturers have also argued that restrictions on tobacco advertising and 
sponsorship violate their right to free commercial expression.
(121)
 Freedom of expression is of 
a different nature, as it does not pertain to the products, the services or the brands 
manufacturers place on the market, but to the commercial discourse they develop in order to 
promote their consumption. 
 
Under Article 10 of the ECHR, ‗everyone has the right to freedom of expression‘,(122) and this 
provision has been held to apply not only to artistic and political but also to commercial 
expression,
(123)
 on the ground that consumers have the right to receive information on the 
goods and services available to them on a given market: ‗for the citizen, advertising is a 
means of discovering the characteristics of goods and services offered to him‘.(124) 
Nevertheless, freedom of expression may also be restricted on public health and other public 
interest grounds provided that the restriction in question is proportionate.
(125)
Thus, in the 
Tobacco Advertising II judgment, the Court rejected the argument put forward by tobacco 
manufacturers that the contested TAD constituted an unlawful interference with their right to 
free commercial expression. After recalling its settled case law that the EU legislature should 
be granted a broad margin of discretion in areas entailing political, economic and social 
choices on its part, and in which it was called upon to undertake complex assessments,
(125)
 the 
Court concluded that even assuming that the measures laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Directive prohibiting advertising and sponsorship had the effect of weakening freedom of 
expression indirectly, the measures they imposed were not disproportionate. The legality of a 
measure such as the ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship can be affected only if the 
measure is „manifestly inappropriate‟ having regard to the objective which the competent 
institutions seek to pursue.
(126)
 That the judiciary grants a broad margin of discretion to the 
legislature – be it the EU legislature or the national legislature (127) – is all the more necessary, 
„in a field as complex and fluctuating as advertising‟.(127) 
 
The Court has tended to grant an extremely broad margin of discretion to the EU legislature 
in determining how far it would restrict fundamental rights to ensure a high level of public 
health protection. It is highly commendable that the Court has not substituted its assessment 
to that of the legislature.
xl
 Tobacco control regulation does involve complex assessments 
which result not only from the scientific understanding of specific health risks but also from 
the social and political evaluation of those risks.
(128)
 EU political institutions are better 
equipped than the Court to determine how competing interests should be balanced against 
each other. This does not mean, however, that the EU legislature has a carte blanche: it bears 
the burden of proving that the measures it has adopted are suitable and necessary to achieve 
their objective of reducing the health and social burden resulting from tobacco use in the EU. 
                                                             
xl The respective role of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and should remain so: J. Jowell, ‗Beyond the 
Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review‘, Public Law (2000) 671, at p.681. 
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Discretion does not mean arbitrariness.
xli
 If the Court‘s decision in Tobacco Advertising II 
may be criticised for its failure to engage as effectively as it could have with existing 
evidence demonstrating the proportionality of the advertising ban, the outcome of the case is 
nonetheless compelling.
(87)
 The FCTC has called on its Parties to introduce comprehensive 
bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship so that the consumption of tobacco 
products is reduced.
 (31)
 Thus, it is legitimate for the EU and its Member States as parties to 
the FCTC to limit the freedom of industry operators to promote cigarettes and other tobacco 
products whose consumption is inherently harmful to health. Advertising bans and packaging 
restrictions are therefore intended to support the creation of a „passive market‟ for tobacco 
products: if such products can still lawfully be placed on the EU market, the EU and its 
Member States nonetheless have a duty to regulate this market to steer existing and potential 
consumers away from smoking in light of the costs of smoking and the evidence linking 
marketing and consumption patterns. The legality of a measure such as the ban on tobacco 
advertising and sponsorship can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate 
having regard to the objective which the competent institutions seek to pursue.
(117)
 
 
Shifting the paradigm: using fundamental rights as a ‘sword’ 
 
The shortcomings of the fundamental rights discourse developed by industry operators, where 
fundamental rights are invoked as a „shield‟, i.e. by the tobacco industry as a way to 
systematically challenge tobacco control measures, are even more glaring if assessed in light 
of the arguments supporting the use of fundamental rights as a „sword‟, i.e. by legislators as a 
vehicle for better health as part of their tobacco control strategies.
xlii
 
 
If the ECHR does not contain specific provisions on health, the EU Charter does: Article 35 
provides that „a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities‟. Furthermore, the right to health can be 
considered as falling within the general principles of EU law in light of the fact that all 
Member States have ratified the two UN Treaties offering its most comprehensive 
expression, namely: Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).
xliii
 Therefore, the question is not so much whether the right to health is protected by 
the EU legal order, but what this right entails and how it can be operationalised to support 
effective tobacco control strategies, including the adoption of plain packaging schemes. 
                                                             
xli English courts have expressed this point elegantly: ‗The protection of public health is a very important counter-balance to 
unrestricted commercial expression. It is not a factor affording to a decision maker an unfettered discretion.‘ (McCombe J. in 
The Queen v BAT UK et al, [2004] EWHC 2493 (Admin), at paragraph 32. 
xlii This argument was first made and is developed more fully in A. Alemanno and A. Garde (2013). Regulating Lifestyles in 
Europe: How to Prevent and Control Non-Communicable Diseases Associated with Tobacco, Alcohol and Unhealthy Diets? 
Swedish Institute for European Policy. 
xliii One should note that before the adoption of the ICESCR and the CRC, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights already provided: ‗everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and the well-being of himself 
and of his family‘. The right to health has also been expressed in a range of other UN Treaties, including the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. For a comprehensive discussion of the right to 
health in international law, see J. Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (OUP, 2012). 
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The concept of health is defined very broadly as ‗a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being‘, rather than merely the absence of disease or infirmity.(129) As such, this 
definition, which was explicitly endorsed by the CJEU in its Working Time Directive 
judgment,
 (130)
 extends the right to health beyond the provision of medical care to encompass 
the right to prevention, treatment and control of diseases. This is not to say, however, that the 
right to health is a right to be healthy; rather, it is „a right to the highest attainable standard 
of health‟,(131) subject both to an individual‘s biological, social, cultural and economic 
preconditions and the State‘s available resources. In particular, the right to health requires 
that States ensure „the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases‟,(132) that they „develop preventive health care‟(133) and that they „combat 
disease and malnutrition‟.(134)  
 
In recent years, a growing number of international law documents have confirmed that States 
can invoke the right to health in order to promote healthier lifestyles and support their 
tobacco control strategies. Thus, the FCTC refers explicitly to Article 12 of the ICESCR in its 
Preamble. This supports the argument that several scholars have put forward that tobacco 
control is an integral component in the protection of the right to health.
(135)
 Not only is the 
burden of the tobacco pandemic not fairly distributed – tobacco consumption rates being 
much higher among poor communities both within and among States. But exposure to 
tobacco prevents the fulfilment of the right to health, as well as several health-related rights, 
including the right to life, the right to a clean environment and the right to information. 
Tobacco control measures, including the adoption of standardised packaging schemes, are 
therefore arguably intended to implement the commitments of public authorities to respect, 
protect and fulfil these rights.
(135)
 
 
In light of the interdependence and indivisibility of international human rights, the realisation 
of the right to health is indispensable for the enjoyment of all the other rights, and achieving 
the right to health is dependent on the realisation of many other human rights. The other 
rights which could be invoked in relation to tobacco control include the right to life, the right 
to a clean environment, the right to information,
(136)
 the right to education, and the umbrella 
principle requiring that all actions concerning children shall be taken in their best interest.
xliv
 
 
Embracing a fundamental-rights approach to tobacco control would not only strengthen the 
basis for the adoption of effective smoking prevention and control measures, but it would 
also highlight the need to reduce social disparities in health between different population 
groups, providing equality of opportunity for all to enjoy the highest attainable standard of 
health.
(137)
 
 
                                                             
xliv In its General Comment N° 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary 
consideration, the Committee on the Rights of the Child stated: ‗one needs to bear in mind that the purpose of assessing and 
determining the best interests of the child is to ensure the full and effective enjoyment of the rights recognised in the 
Convention and its Optional Protocols, and the holistic development of the child‘ (at paragraph 82). 
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While virtually all attempts made by the tobacco industry to challenge the legality of 
measures adopted at national or EU level to regulate tobacco products have been 
accompanied by the invocation of a breach of fundamental rights, as discussed above, this 
does not imply that the law cannot be used as a tool to promote the right to health and several 
other fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order. Some encouraging signs can be 
found in the recent case law of EU Courts. For example, in its Deutsches Weintor 
decision,
(138)
 the CJEU specifically relied on Article 35 of the EU Charter to dismiss the 
claims of alcoholic beverages industry operators that the EU legislature had exceeded the 
limits on its margin of discretion by banning the use of health claims on all beverages 
containing more than 1.2% alcohol by volume.
(139)
 This decision supports the argument that 
fundamental rights may be invoked not only as a shield by industry operators to protect their 
private economic interests, but also as a sword by competent regulatory authorities – be it the 
EU or its Member States – when regulating, in the general public interest, the activities of 
these very operators.
xlv
 
  
                                                             
xlv It is noteworthy that the wording of Article 35 of the EU Charter is less prescriptive than Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (as broadly interpreted by General Comment N°14 (2000) and Article 24 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the two main sources of the right to health in international law. 
Nevertheless, Article 35 should be interpreted in their light for coherence purposes. 
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IV. Conclusion on the compatibility of a UK plain packaging scheme on tobacco 
products with the TPD 
 
The drivers behind the enactment of standardised packaging legislation at the national level 
are similar to those that might lead the EU to adopt these requirements. In the area of 
tobacco, all Member States are parties to the FCTC. In particular, Article 11 and Article 13 of 
the Convention and their implementing Guidelines encourage them to develop effective 
restrictions on the labelling and advertising of tobacco products. In principle, in the absence 
of EU regulatory action, Member States are free to adopt standardised packaging schemes 
within their own jurisdictions,
(140)
 provided that they comply with the conditions laid down in 
the TPD and in the EU Treaties. 
 
Our analysis suggests that the UK Department of Health enjoys a broad margin of discretion 
to introduce a standardisation scheme of tobacco products, such as the one it proposed in the 
framework of the 2014 Consultation, on its territory. The evidence supporting standardised 
packaging keeps accumulating. The Chantler Review adds to the calls for standardised 
packaging, and does so in no uncertain terms – though it recognises the inherent limitations 
of the evidence policy makers have at their disposal. As it points out in its concluding 
remarks, „it is important to note that proponents of standardised packaging include the World 
Health Organization, Public Health England, local Directors of Public Health and a host of 
experts involved in the field of human health‟, i.e. „long-time devoted members of the public 
health community‘.(141) The UK‘s proposed regulations and its Impact Assessment draw on 
this evidence and present it as clearly as possible bearing the conditions the TPD and the EU 
Treaties lay down to determine the validity of a national scheme standardising tobacco 
products. 
 
A broad margin of discretion does not mean that the UK will not have to justify its measures 
if they are challenged before the CJEU or before national courts on the basis of EU law: as 
we hope we have shown, discretion does not equate with arbitrariness. Consequently, the 
Government should be fully aware of the conditions the TPD and the EU Treaties lay down 
and how these conditions are likely to be interpreted by the CJEU or by national courts. In 
particular, it needs to be aware of the importance of framing existing evidence within the 
limits of the proportionality test – and its two limbs of suitability and necessity – to increase 
its chances of success. We have argued that there is ample scope to do so successfully, in 
light of the evidence supporting the introduction of standardised packaging schemes as 
effective tobacco control measures and more specifically the explicit calls of the international 
public health community on the Parties to the FCTC to consider implementing such schemes, 
even in their most restrictive form of plain packaging.   
 
 
In this Legal Opinion, we have focused on the compatibility of the UK draft 
Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations with EU law. We concluded 
that all the packaging requirements they propose are compatible with both the EU TPD 
and, more generally, EU law. However, the introduction of standardised packaging in 
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the UK is set to raise legal concerns not only under EU law (and in particular under free 
movement, trademark and fundamental rights law), but also under other legal orders. 
In particular, as illustrated by the numerous pending litigations brought against 
Australia, the  Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations are likely to be 
challenged under WTO law
(142)
 and investment regimes applicable to the UK. Similarly, 
the introduction of these regulations may be challenged in judicial review actions based 
on English law, not least on the basis of the Human Rights Act 1998 as interpreted by 
English courts.
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xlvi In relation to tobacco control, see for example The Queen v BAT UK et al [2004] EWHC 2493 …(Admin). 
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